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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In the first years of the Archidamian War Sparta resolved
to gain quick victory by invading and devastating Attica.
Under the persuasive

influence

of

Perikles

the Athenians

responded by seeking protection behind their walls and by
avoiding

pitched

battles.

They

followed

this

strategy

successfully until several years after Perikles' death. The
Spartan invasions proved ineffective; thus, Sparta initiated
a new strategy. It aimed to destabilize Athens' alliances in
Thrace and the Hellespont,

disrupt the tribute from these

allies and, possibly, deprive Athens of its grain supply from
the Black Sea.
Execution of

these plans required a

secure route to

Thrace for uninterrupted flow of support troops and logistical
supplies. In the following it will be shown that such a route
was not only gained by Sparta, but was secured and controlled
during the Archidamian War by an unprecedented colonization
effort of the Spartans

in Trachis with the foundation of

Herakleia Trachinia in 426. 1

1

All Greek names, toponyms and terms will use the Greek
spelling, with the exception of commonly used spell~ngs in
English which are different from the Greek. All dates given
hereafter will be B.C., unless otherwise noted.

Ancient sources and modern

commenta~ors

place the new

colony in the environs of the Trachinian cliffs along the
southwestern rim of

the Malian Gulf, 2 and

concentrate on

Herakleia's proximity to Thermopylai as the raison d'etre for
its

existence.

Recent

investigations

of

the

Phokis-Doris

Expedition of Loyola University contradict these theories. 3
According to topographical and geological evidence, Herakleia
could not, nor did, neutralize Thermopylai. Instead, Herakleia
controlled an all-weather road system within a natural Isthmus
corridor west of Thermopylai that connected the Malian and
Corinthian Gulfs and bypassed Thermopylai. Located near the
Corridor's northern entrance, the Dhema Gap, Herakleia was the
key for Spartan movements between Central and Northern Greece.
This study is based on autopsy and topographical research
that the author completed in three seasons as a member of the
Phokis-Doris Expedition in Greece. It will argue that Sparta
selected the site of Herakleia to control this road system
through Central Greece to implement new strategic plans in the
latter part of the Archidamian War, 426-421.

2

I accept with some reservations the generally accepted
locus of the colony. A detailed discussion of the site of
ancient Herakleia and its topography, based on ancient
sources, modern investigators and autopsy will be given below.
E. w. Kase et al.
Route, Minneapolis, 1991
3

(eds.), The Great Isthmus Corridor
2

CHAPTER II
PROLEGOMENA

Beginnings
At the beginning of the Archidamian War the declared
purpose of the Spartan Alliance was the liberation of the
subjects

of

Athens

(2.8.4) . 4

According

to

Thukydides,

however, the true explanation for the Spartan initiative was
fear created by the growth in Athenian power (1.23.6), and the
consequent Spartan resolve to break that power and to dissolve
the Athenian Empire (1.88; Gemme 1945:256; Hammond 1986:347).
For Sparta, a land power, the strategy was simple: march
into Attica in the spring to destroy homes and growing crops
outside the walls
successful

against

of the city. 5 Such invasion had proved
Athens

in

the

past. 6

Faced with the

4

References to book and chapter in which the author's
name is not given are to Thukydides.
5

Attica was invaded in 431, 430, 428, 427 and 425. The
longest period of time the Peloponnesians spent in Attica was
40 days in 430 (2. 57); the shortest was 15 days in 425
(4.6.2). In 429 there was no invasion, perhaps for fear of the
plague (Kagan 1974:101-2). Instead, that year the Spartans
began the siege of Plataiai.
6

In 446 King Pleistoanax of Sparta invaded and laid
waste Attica as far as Eleusis and Thria (1.114). Not long
afterwards the Athenians made a truce with the Lakedaimonians
and their allies which was to last for thirty years (1~115.1).
3

invasion of Attica, the Athenians could either go out to fight
the enemy and meet certain

defeat,

or retreat within the

walls and see homes and crops destroyed. 7

Effective siege

techniques against walled cities had not been mastered by the
Greeks of the fifth century, 8

and the storm or siege of

Athens was not therefore considered a feasible alternative.
Athenian strategy, following Perikles' mandate to counter
the Spartan offensive, was clear: neither offer nor accept a
land battle with the enemy; consider Athens an island to be
safeguarded,

and,

if

necessary,

abandon

homes

(1.143.4/5; 2.13; 2.65/67; Bengtson 1988:138). 9

and

lands

An expected

stalemate with Sparta would mean victory, because Sparta would
eventually become disenchanted and seek peace. 10

7

The Spartans would hope for a pitched battle with the
Athenians. In any such battle the Peloponnesians would
undoubtedly be victorious. Even Perikles conceded that in a
single battle the Peloponnesians and their allies were strong
enough to withstand all the Hellenes (1.141.6). The Spartans
believed that after a year or two of invasions the Athenians
would be forced to capitulate. No one believed Athens could
last more than three years of repeated devastation (7.28.3).
8

Sparta in particular was inept in siege warfare. The
Lakedaimonians had to appeal to Athens for assistance in the
siege of Ithome because of their own deficiencies in this
technique (1.102.2; Gemme 1945:301; Kagan:1969:71; 1974:20).
9

Perikles' strategy has been compared with the strategy
of attrition of Frederick the Great during the Seven Years War
(Delbrilck 1975:135-142, espec. excurs. #2 on p. 140; Adcock
CAH 5 196; Bury 1975:253).
10

Sparta had not been too eager to enter the war in the
first place, but had deferred to the entreaties of Corinth
whose commercial rivalry with Athens kindled the flames which
led to the War (1.67-88; Gomme 1945 ad l.c.; Bengtson
1988: 135).
4

Apparently, Sparta had not considered that Athens would
be able to withstand the devastation of fields and crops by
the importation of food by sea. 11
429,

But, perhaps as early as

the Spartans realized that their annual invasions of

Attica would not force Athens to capitulate (Busolt 1920:322323; Gemme 1956b.395). They became aware that Athens' control
of

the

Hellespont

and

the

Bosporos

insured

regular

and

unimpeded shipments of grain from the littoral of the northern
Aegean

and the

lasted,
Attica. 13

Black

the Athenians
Thus,

Sea. 12

So

long as

could withstand

Sparta

had

to

find

this

the

food

supply

devastation

another

of

strategy to

11

The topographical similarity of Athens with her Long
Walls to Miletos, which in 496 was able to withstand a long
Persian siege because imports from the sea were available
(Hdt. 1.17), was probably unknown to Sparta (Brunt JCAC 19
1965:264).
12

By the fifth century Athens was required to import
food. Of the four main granaries serving the Mediterranean
world in this period, Egypt after 454 was again under Persian
influence (1.109.2-3; Diod. 11.75, 77); North Africa was under
Carthaginian influence; and Sicily and southern Italy were not
only a great distance away but under the influence of Sparta
(Ehrenberg 1951:326; Michell 1957:20,228; French 1964: 108113). The littoral of the Black Sea, and the northern Aegean,
were the most important granaries for Athens, also supplying
other food stuffs, including dried fish.

13

The importance of the Hellespontine route for Athens
cannot be overstated (Kagan 1969:179-80; Noonan, "The Grain
Trade of the Northern Black Sea in Antiquity," AJP 1973:23142; Starr 1989:17). After the Samian and Byzantine rebellions
had been subdued, Perikles resolved to strengthen Athenian
influence in the area. The founding of Amphipolis in 437 was
intended to prevent rebellion and guard the vital route to the
Hellespont (4.102.3; Kagan 1969:187).
5

interdict the shipment of these supplies and to force the
capitulation of Athens.
Changed Strategy
Thrace, the littoral of the northern Aegean, was the only
region of the extended Athenian empire that was vulnerable by
land.

If

Greece,

the

Spartans,

with the most

could gain control of Thrace,

formidable

Thrace

1965:274;
revenues

had
Kagan

the

greatest

1974:288);

and timber,

value
it

not

to

in

they could strike a

serious blow at Athens' tribute-paying allies. 14
in

army

Athens

only

Amphipolis
(Brunt

furnished

JCAC

mining

it also commanded the Strymon river

crossing and the route to the rich subject allies of Athens on
the Hellespont and the Bosporos.
Athens' hold over these territories was tenuous at best.
Athenian supremacy in the Attic Maritime League had from the
sixties onward induced various members to avoid her oppressive
rule

{Bengtson

1988:129). 15

Furthermore,

the

revolt

of

Potidaia in 432 had been followed by revolts of the Bottiaians
and Chalkidians, and these revolts had never been suppressed
(1.57.5;58;2.79;

Bengtson 1988:136). The siege of Potidaia

14

The formulation of this brilliant strategy has been
attributed to Brasidas (Gemme 1956b:395 n. 4; Kagan 1974:196).
Cartledge calls Brasidas the founder of Herakleia {1987:45).
Thukydides does not comment on Brasidas' role in the
formulation of the plan.
15

There is evidence for more than 400 cities in the Attic
Maritime League in 425, according to Bengtson (1988:115).
Starr states that at its height Athens ruled directly 179
states which included perhaps 2,000,000 Greeks {1989:38).
6

also had taught a lesson to both Athens and Sparta. Athens
became aware of the precariousness of her alliances in that
region, 16 and Sparta painfully realized that lack of a land
passage to Thrace forced her to abandon Potidaia to Athens. 17
Thus, a new Spartan strategy was formulated. It aimed to
strike at the tribute-paying allies

of Athens along the

Thracian littoral. The Spartans hoped that the presence of
spartan hoplites in Chalkidike and Thrace would induce other
allies of Athens to rebel {Gemme 1956b:359; Busolt 1967:1011

& n. 1) 18 and imperil Athens' supply of grain from the Black
Sea (4.108.1; 105.1; Gomme 1956b:580-581; Brunt JCAC 1965:274;
Kagan 1974:196; Bengtson 1988:124).
Sparta's Opportunity
To implement this new strategy Sparta needed an overland
route through Central Greece and Thessaly,

as well as an

easily defensible base to guarantee the flow of logistical
16

After the tenuousness of support in the Chalkidike
became clear, Athens attempted to strengthen alliances with
the Thracian tribes, particularly the Odrysians, and Macedon.
By a diplomatic coup in 431 Athens gained an alliance with
Sitalkes, the King of Thrace (2.29). Sitalkes brought about a
short-lived reconciliation between Athens and Macedon.
17

• Grote accurately observed that it was "the impracticability of such passage" by the Spartans that forced them "to
leave Potidaia to its fate" {Grote 6.308).
18

• In 432 the Corinthians at the Assembly of Sparta and
her allies had suggested that the Spartans assist the allies
of Athens to revolt, thereby depriving Athens of revenue and
sailors (1.121). Following the revolt of Mytelene in 428,
Sparta sent a fleet of 40 ships to assist the rebellious
Lesbians {3.26.1).

7

support

to

the

north

(3. 92. 4;

Brunt JCAC

19

1965:

Kagan

1974:196).
A unique opportunity presented itself to Sparta, probably
by the third year of the Archidamian War,
gain control

of

such a

i.e.

route through Central

429/428, to
Greece and

establish a base at a key geographic location in Malis in the
direction of Thrace. The route was partially controlled by the
oitaians (Szemler GICR 83-86), whose mountainous region lay
between Trachis to the north and the Doris to the south.
unable to resist effectively the aggressive ravaging of their
territories

by the

Oitaians,

the Trachinians

and

Dorians

requested Spartan assistance (3.92.2). The Spartans' response
to the invitation was predictable. They decided to dispatch
colonists to the Malian Gulf to found a fortified colony, from
which they would have access to Thrace.
But Sparta had never been a colonizer, and its expansion
had historically been within the Peloponnese. The decision to
found a colony was an extraordinary event in Spartan history.
Sparta colonized Taras or Tarentum in Italy circa 700 with
partheniai,

young

Spartans born out of wedlock while the

Spartan army was away at war,
wanted to get rid of them

only because the government

(Strabo 6.3.2-3).

Earlier myths

relate Spartan origins for Lyttos in Crete, Lokri in Italy and
Thera (A.H.M. Jones 11/12).

8

Doris was the traditional mother city of Sparta, and for
intervention
imperative 19

in

Trachis,

(1.107.2).

Sparta

Omens

and

could

claim

natural

a

moral

catastrophes

occurring at the time may have also influenced the highly
superstitious Spartans that the timing was propitious, 20
the

decision

was

based

on

newly

formulated

but

strategic

considerations.

19

Diodoros Sikoulos informs us that it was because of
the Spartans' kinship with the Dorians and because Herakles,
their ancestor, had made his home in Trachis that they decided
to make the colony into a great city (Diod. 12.59.4).
20

The Spartans had consulted the oracle of Delphi in
432 whether it was propitious to go to war against Athens. The
god told them they would be victorious, and that he himself
would help them (1.118.3). The Spartans might assume that the
plague, which struck the population in Athens and the troops
of Hagnon besieging Potidaia (2.58.2) was the action of the
god. Apollo has traditionally been identified as the god of
pestilence. Cf. Smintheos, the mouse-god, in Iliad Bk. 1.
In the winter of 427 a great number of earthquakes occurred in
Athens, Euboia and Boiotia (3.87.4). In the same winter the
plague broke out again in Athens. In the summer of 426, the
year Herakleia was founded, an earthquake forced King Agis of
Sparta to abort at the Isthmus the fifth campaign to Attica
(3.89.1; Died. 12.59.1). In the same summer devastating floods
occurred in Euboia and the coast of Opuntian Lokris,
destroying Athenian fortifications at Atalante (3.89.2-4).
Earthquakes also caused the postponement of the meeting of the
Ekklesia (5.45.4) According to Thukydides no other period in
history witnessed disasters, such as earthquakes, eclipses of
the sun, droughts, famine and pestilence as the Peloponnesian
War (1.23.1-3).

9

CHAPTER III
HERAKLEIA: PURPOSE AND FOUNDATION

Ancient Sources
Among the many ancient Greek and Roman literary sources
which refer to Herakleia Trachinia, 21

only Thukydides and

oiodoros make any direct reference to the foundation of the
colony.

Both

attribute

the

foundation

of

the

colony

to

Sparta's intention to support the Dorians and Trachinians in
their struggle against Oitaian aggression.

21

All ancient sources referring to Herakleia, other
than Thukydides and Diodoros Sikoulos, concern themselves with
events occurring in the centuries after its foundation.
Xenophon describes the defeat of the Herakleiots by the
Oitaians in 409 and the destruction of its walls by Jason of
Pherai in 371 (Xen. Hell. 1.2.18; 6.4.7; 6.4.27; 6.5.23).
Pausanias provides valuable descriptions of its topography and
environs and its connection with Herodotos' "Pass through
Trachis" into Greece, in relating the invasion of Central
Greece by the Celts in 279 (Her. 8.31-35; Paus. 10.20.6-8;
21.1-2;
22.1;
22.8;
23.12).
Strabo's
references
to
topographical landmarks, e.g. the Asopos river, are invaluable
in locating the site
(Strabo 8.6.24; 8.8.5;9.2.23; 9.4.13;
9.4.17). Livy, writing half a millennium after the foundation
of Herakleia, describes the city when it was besieged by the
Romans in 191. Livy is useful for locating physical landmarks,
e.g. the citadel, and confirming Herakleia's strategic
importance for the control of the Corridor (Livy 28.5; 31.46;
33.3; 36.15-17; 36.22-25; 36.30). Although none of these
authors discuss the foundation of the colony, their importance
in assessing its location and strategic importance requires
that they be evaluated carefully.
10

The alleged main purpose is explained by Thukydides as
follows: 22
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"It was about this time that the Lakedaimonians
established Herakleia, their colony in Trachinia, with the
following object in view. The people of Malis, considered as
a whole, consist of three divisions, Paralians, Hiereans and
Trachinians. Of these the Trachinians after they had been
ruined in war by their neighbors, the Oitaians, at first
intended to attach themselves to the Athenians, but, fearing
that these might not be loyal, sent to Lakedaimon, choosing
Teisamenos as their envoy. And envoys from Doris, the mother
city of the Lakedaimonians, also took part in the embassy,
making the same request, for they too were being ruined by the
Oitaians. After hearing their appeal, the Lakedaimonians were
of the opinion that they should send out the colony, wishing
to aid both the Trachinians and the Dorians" (3.92.1-4 tr.
C.F. Smith).
11

According to Diodoros, the purpose of the foundation was
as follows: 23
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Unlike Diodoros, Thukydides, gives additional reasons for
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23

"While these events were taking place,
the
Lakedaimonians colonized Trachis, as it was called, and
renamed it Herakleia, for the following reasons: the
Trachinians had been at war with the neighboring Oitaians for
many years and had lost the larger number of their citizens.
Since the city was deserted, they thought it proper that the
Lakedaimonians who were colonists from Trachis, should assume
the care of it. And the Lakedaimonians, both because of their
kinship and because Herakles, their ancestor, in ancient times
had made his home in Trachis, decided to make it a great city"
(Diod. 12.59.3-4 tr.C.H. Oldfather).
24 "At the same time, the site of the proposed city seemed
to them well adapted for carrying on the war against Athens;
for a fleet could be equipped there for an attack upon Euboia
and the crossing thus made from a short distance away, and the
place would also be useful for expeditions along the coast
towards Thrace. In short, they were eager to found the
settlement" (3.92.4 tr. C.F. Smith).
12

Thus, Thukydides informs us, almost parenthetically, that
the Spartans

were also eager to found Herakleia because the

site of the proposed city seemed to them well adapted for
carrying on the war against Athens,

offering as the first

reason that a fleet could be equipped there for an attack upon
Euboia (3.92.4).
Thukydides discusses the Athenians' concern with the use
of Herakleia as a naval base: 25
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(3.93.1)
Evidently, the Athenians' fears were real. Euboia was a
rich and important island, situated on the principal route for
Athenian ships sailing to the Hellespont (Kagan 1969:124) and
paying sizable tribute to Athens (2.14; 8.9.52). Its loss as
an ally would indeed be ominous for Athens and would place an
intolerable strain on the empire. 26 •

25

"As for the Athenians, while the colonists were being
gathered for this city, they at first became alarmed, thinking
it was being established chiefly as a menace to Euboia,
because it is only a short distance across from here to
Kenaion in Euboia" {3.93.1 tr. C.F. Smith).
26

The immediacy with which Perikles responded to the
revolt of Euboia in 446 attests to its importance to Athens
{l.113.3; 1.114.1; Plut. Per. 22.1)).
13

Yet, according to Thukydides, no harm ever came to Euboia
from the colony: 27
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There is no evidence that Herakleia was ever used by the
Spartans as a base for naval operations (Kelly 1987:49); in
fact, a Spartan naval assault from Herakleia would have been
unrealistic in view of Sparta's previous experiences with the
Athenian fleet (Kagan 1974:196).
If the naval docks were built at all,
discussed below,

an issue to be

they did not reflect the intention of the

Spartans who relied

traditionally on the army, rather than a

navy, to accomplish military objectives. 28

In giving primary

strategic importance to Herakleia as a naval base, Thukydides
may have reflected his own fears, rather than the intention of
the Spartans. His obsession with the importance of naval power
pervades his Histories 29

and may have colored his assessment

v "Afterwards, however, the matter turned out contrary
to their expectations; for no harm came from the city" (3. 93 .1
tr. C.F. Smith).
28

It took the Athenians a long time to appreciate the
threat that Herakleia posed for them in Thrace (Gomme
1965b: 398).
29

The following are among the numerous references made
by Thukydides in Book I to sea power and its importance: in
earlier days there was no land commerce (implying communications were all by sea) (1.2.2); Minos, by being the first to
acquire a navy, made himself master of the Hellenic Sea
(1.4.1); commerce and surplus revenues gained by cities
founded on the sea permitted them to thrive (1.71); wealth of
14

of

Sparta's

Herakleia was

purpose.

Thus,

intended as a

Thukydides'

statement

that

naval base against Euboia is

debatable. We may even speculate whether his statement that
the colony would also serve as a land base for Thrace was a
revision made by him only after Brasidas' march to Thrace in
424 had made Sparta's intent patent. 30
islanders seemed to depend on seafaring and the establishment
of safe navigation by Minos (1.8.2); Agamemnon was able to
assemble his fleet because he surpassed all other princes in
power ( 1. 9 .1) ; Pelops acquired his power by reason of the
great \\1aalth brought back (by ships) from Asia ( 1. 9 .1);
Agamemnon ruled over many islands by virtue of his fleet
(1.9.4); Agamemnon's fleet in Troy had 1200 ships (1.9.4); as
the Hellenes became more powerful and wealthy, they began to
fit out navies and apply themselves to the sea (1.1.3.1); the
earliest sea fight of record was between the Corinthians and
Korkyrans (1.13.3); Hellenes in olden days communicated with
one another more by sea than by land (1.1.3.5); the
Corinthians raised their city to great power, when they
acquired ships and offered a market by sea ( 1.13. 5) ; the
Ionians, by acquiring a powerful navy, kept control of the sea
from the Persians
(1.13.6);
the Phokaians,
colonizing
Massalla, conquered the Carthaginians in a sea fight 1.13.6);
the development of the trireme was made by the tyrants in
Sicily and Korkyra shortly before the Persian War (1.14.3);
until the Persian War most ships, including the Athenian, consisted only of 50 oars ( 1.14. 3) ; no expeditions by land
resulted in accession of power, only expeditions by sea
(1.15.2); Darius was able to enslave the islands because of
his possession of the Phoenician fleet (1.16); the Athenians
became sailors, when in response to the Persian attacks, they
abandoned their city and boarded ships ( 1. 18. 2) ; Athens
emerged as the most powerful naval force after the Persian War
(1.18.2); Athens maintained her hegemony by taking over the
ships of allied cities (1.19)).
30

Thukydides might have kept contemporary diaries of the
war which he later revised and "subordinated to a considered
design of the work as a whole" (Gemme 5 1981: 384). The
passages describing the foundation of the colony (3.92-3) also
ref er to the Boiotian control of the colony and the expulsion
of Agesippidas, ca. 419 (5.51-52.1; Gemme 5 1981:408) The
question whether the stated purpose of the colony as a roadway
to Thrace may have been a textual revision made after
15

Modern commentaries: Purpose of Herakleia
Modern commentators appear divided in their assessment of
Herakleia's value to Sparta as a passage to Thrace, a reason
to which Thukydides apparently assigned secondary importance.
Representative examples will suffice.
According to Georg Grote "the passage of troops against
the

subject-allies

of

Athens

in

Thrace,

would

also

be

facilitated" by such a colony (Grote 6.308). A. W. Gomme notes
that Sparta was exploring other means to win the war by a sea
attack and "a distant expedition by land" (Gomme 1956b:395),
clearly a reference to Thrace.

Donald Kagan suggests that the

Spartans intended to expand the land war into Thrace, which is
underscored

by

his

consideration

unrealistic

(Kagan 1974: 196).

of

the

sea

campaign

as

Hermann Bengtson hedges his

position by stating that Herakleia would provide the Spartans

a

base against Central Greece

(Bengtson 1988: 141).

F.

Adcock does not mention the threat to Euboia at all,
suggests

that

opportunistic

the

entire

afterthought

implemented in 424
(Adcock CAH 5:243).

Thracian
of

project

Brasidas'

only through fear of a

was

E.
and
an

adventurism,
Helot uprising

According to J.B. Bury and R. Meiggs,

Euboia was the primary purpose for the foundation of the
colony,

and Chalkidike,

mentioned

the secondary; Thrace is not even

(Bury 1975:265).

In N.

G.

L. Hammond's view the

Brasidas' campaign in 424 is unanswered.
16

primary purpose for the foundation of the colony was a base
from

which

"to

push

northward

chalcidians and Bottiaeans";

to

join

hands

with

the

and the secondary purpose an

attack on Euboia (Hammond 1986:361). Simon Hornblower suggests
that the two motives Thukydides gives are "not quite enough on
their own to explain the giant size of the colony", but fails
to offer any other reason (Hornblower 1991:505). P. A. Brunt
alone appears unequivocal in recognizing that the purpose of
the colony was "to attack the only part of Athens'

empire

which they could reach by land, the Thracian districts" (Brunt
JCAC 1965:265-266).
Among contemporary commentators one intriguing suggestion
has been raised by G.

Bockisch, according to whom Sparta's

purpose for the foundation of Herakleia was the creation of a
new territory of perioikoi in Central Greece

(Bockisch AA

1967:311-317). She cites overpopulation at home as a reason,
but the assumption of an expansionistic policy for Sparta in
the Archidamian War is not supported by the evidence presented
and must be rejected. 31

31

In Bockisch' s earlier publication "Harmostai" (Klio 46
1965:129-23(9), she suggested that Spartan imperialism was
Sparta's motive in colonizing the fertile, plains of Malis,
citing Lysander's actions, as an example of Spartan policy.
The assumption that the post-Peloponnesian War reality of
Spartan imperialism motivated Sparta while in a grim struggle
for survival with Athens, a half century earlier, is highly
questionable. Furthermore, the first mention of Sparta's use
of harmosts is not until 412, when Agis provided a harmost for
the Lesbians (8.5.2.; Gomme 1956b:623).
17

If we accept that the purpose of the colony was a base to
Thrace, a problem arises, nevertheless, because the ancient
sources lack details necessary to identify the parodos, or
passage,

from the Peloponnese to the Malian Gulf and from

there to Thrace, along which Herakleia was situated.
Modern commentators,

unaware of the

Isthmus Corridor

route, have mistakenly concluded that only the coastal road by
Thermopylai provided such an access, 32

and the strategic

purpose of Herakleia was to secure this coastal road.n

a.

G.

Grundy and Johannes Kromayer both considered Herakleia a

necessary

factor

in

the

defense

of

Thermopylai

(Grundy

1901:264, 268 n.; Kromayer 1907:137).
such a single-minded focus on Thermopylai, supported by
indirect

references

in

ancient

sources, 34

has

formed

the

communis opinio expressed by Grundy who explicitly states that
no road for military use into Central Greece existed west of
Thermopylai (Grundy 1901:267 n.). Grundy also concluded that

32

These commentators follow Herodotos' description of the
Persian advance to Thermopylai and his reference to the
impassable mountains along the southern rim of the Malian Gulf
(Hdt. 7 .176, 7. 198) . Macan 1908: I, 399; How-Wells 1928:
2. 233; Burn 1962: 425; Grundy 1901: 362; Munro CAH IV 301;
Hignett 1963; Pritchett 1985:193; Begtson 1988:101. Cf.
Szemler GICR 62.
33

stahlin RE
1985:190 ff.)

424.68-425.9;

34

Bury

1975:366;

Pritchett

Herodotos' reference to Trachis (Hdt. 7 .199), the
identification by Diodoros of Trachis with Herakleia (Died.
12. 59. 3), and the location of the site forty stades from
Thermopylai by Thukydides (3. 92. 6) and six stades from Trachis
by Strabo (Strabo 9.4.13).
18

Herakleia effectively defended the environs of Mt. Oite by
commanding the passes through the Asopos gorge to the wide
upland plain of Mandritsa

(Grundy 1901:264},

an assumption

which has been proved impossible (Szemler GICR 61}. Kromayer
also believed Herakleia's importance was in part based on its
command of the canyon of the Asopos gorge (Kromayer 1907:140}.
According to William Martin Leake, Herakleia "commanded
the passes from Thessaly into Southern Greece, as well along
the shore by Thermopylae into Locris, as over Mount Oeta into
Doris"; but in a

later passage he makes it clear that the

Asopos gorge is the north-south passage into Central Greece
west of Thermopylai (Leake 1835:30-31}.
J. A. R. Munro was, perhaps, the first to question that
Thermopylai furnished the sole route to Central Greece, and
suggests, but does not further identify, a route west of the
Asopos gorge
12). 35

(Munro 1902:292

ff.;

Szemler GICR 63/64

n.

Subsequent investigators, too, sought to define other

penetration routes west of the Asopos (Kromayer-Veith 190331: 2 .127; and 4.54/55; Farrel 1910:116/117; Kolias 1933: 72
ff.; Burn 1977:98; ff.; MacKay 1963:241-45; Wallace 1980:15
ff.;

Pritchett

1982: 220

ff.},

but

did

not

connect

their

suggested routes with Herakleia.

35

Munro states that the citadel of Trachis (later
identified as the site of Herakleia} must have been occupied
by the Greeks in 480 to bar the Persians the route through the
Asopos gorge to Doris (JHS 22, 1902, 313 n. 31}.
19

some scholars recognized the topographical difficulties
and the logistical impracticability of Herakleia controlling
Thermopylai. They concluded that Herakleia was not the key to
the

security of Thermopylai.

They

saw the

value

of this

fortification in its command of an alternate route, or routes,
into central Greece and Doris, from which easy access to the
Kephissos valley or the Corinthian Gulf was available (Cary CQ
1922:98/99;

Bequignon

1937:254;

Andrewes

1978:96

ff.;

Hornblower 1991:505). In their reassessments, however, they
concluded,

without

exception,

that

the

Asopos

gorge

and

Thermopylai were the only principal entrances into Central
Greece. This reassessment is best summed up by Yves Bequignon
(1937:38):
Dans l'antiquite, comme a l'epoque moderne,
la vallee du Spercheios ne communique avec les
pays plus meridionaux que par deux passages:
l'Asopos et les Thermopyles
These

investigators

were

generally

unaware

of

the

existence of the Corridor road system, and therefore, did not
grasp

its

close

topographical

connection

with

Herakleia.

Although Friedrich Stahlin incorrectly connected Herakleia
with the control and defense of Thermopylai, 36 he is the only

36

"H. beherrscht durch seine Lage den Durchgang durch die
Thermopylen und war
aus
diesem Grunde
ein von den
Lakedaimoniern (Thuc. III 92), von Iason van Pherai (Xen.
hell. VI 4, 27) und den Aitolern (Paus. X 20, 9) begehrter
Punkt. H. schliesst zugleich den wichtigen Weg ab, der von
Mittelgriechenland und dem Kephissostal Uber den niedrigen
Oitessal und durch das Asopostal filhrte, Strab. VIII 389.
Diesen Passilbergang beniltzt die heutige Kunststrasse und die
Eisenbahn." stahlin RE 8:424-25.
20

one to recognize the northern entrance to the corridor at Ohio
vouna as the connecting link to Oite from the Spercheios river
valley (RE 5A:2401.63), as well as the strategic unity of the
Thermopylai-Ohema defensive line (RE 5A:2401.21-28).
The Phokis-Ooris Expedition,
privileged

to

participate,

in which this writer was

discovered

and

explored

this

northern entrance to the Corridor at Ohema and its road system
located within a natural passage of passes and upland plains
through Central Greece, connecting the Malian and Corinthian
Gulfs. 37

This Isthmus Corridor, traversing a distance of ca.

37 linear km or ca. 80 km by existing roads, from Amphissa on
the south to the environs of the Malian plain on the north, is
the only easily negotiable,
system

capable

of

all-season,

supporting

well defined road

north-south

migratory movements through Central Greece
1982:357 ff.).

and

(Kase & Szemler

The discovery of the Great Isthmus Corridor

route revealed the
Thermoyplai

military

immense

importance of the Ohio Vouna-

line as a defensive barrier to Central Greece

(Szemler GICR 60-64).

Herakleia,

connected topographically

with the Corridor route and controlling not only its northern
entrance,

the Ohema Gap,

but also,

all overland movements

between Thessaly and Central Greece, was a main component of
this road system. Therefore, the reasons for its foundation by
the Spartans and its impact on events in the Archidamian War
must be reassessed.
37

Kase, E.W. and Szemler, G. 1982; id. GICR 60-64.
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CHAPTER IV
SPARTA IN CENTRAL GREECE
Sparta had an interest in Central Greece long before the
Archidamian War. 38

Precedent was established for such inter-

vention when the Spartans sent troops to assist Doris, their
metropolis

(Tyrtaios Anth.

Gr.,

Diehl 1943 3 ·2),

in Central

Greece thirty years earlier in an armed conflict, which one
may properly entitle the First Peloponnesian War. 39 Sparta
had also attempted before the War to expand her influence in
the

Delphic

Amphiktyony. 40

The

documented

presence

of

Spartan forces in Central Greece before the Archidamian War
precludes

the

possibility of

Spartan

ignorance

about

the

38

Among the aggressive actions taken by Sparta outside
the Peloponnese before the Archidamian War were the campaign
in Boiotia in 519 (Hdt. 6.108), and in Attica to expel the
Pisistradids in 511 (Hdt. 5.63), and the expedition to
Thessaly in 470 (Hdt. 6.72). See Hornblower 1991:503.
39

In 457, following a Phokian attack on Doris, Sparta
sent hoplites to aid the Dorians and force the Phokians to
make peace (1.107.2). With the job done, the Spartans returned
home; there was no attempt made at that time to found a
permanent base.

°

4

For fifth century evidence of Spartan interest in the
Amphiktyony consider Sparta's unsuccessful attempt to exclude
all Greeks who had medized (Plut. Them. 20); also Spartan
intervention in Central Greece in the Second Sacred War
( 1. 112) • A desire to expand influence in the Amphiktyonic
League by gaining control of one of the Trachinian votes has
been offered as a motive for the foundation of the colony,
although there is no evidence that Sparta exercised this vote
until 343 (Hornblower 1991:168,502).
22

corridor

road

system

which,

before

the

opening

of

Thermopylai, 41 was the only route connecting the two centers
of the Amphiktyony, Anthele and Delphi. Thus, we must safely
assume that during the formulation of the new strategic plans,
the

Spartans

were

aware

of

this

road

system,

and

they

considered the strategic and tactical difficulties, as well as
the possibilities, that a fortified eagle's nest at the north
end of the Corridor could offer. They properly concluded that
a colony anchored at this juncture was expedient not only for
expansion into Central Greece, but toward Thessaly and Thrace
as well.
To implement these plans the Spartans were confronted
with five problems. They had to:
1. select an overland route to the new colony;
2.
route,

establish control over the small ethne along this
either

through

political

negotiation

or

military

action;
3. gain the approval of Delphi for colonizing a new site;
4.

ascertain the suitability of the site to build a

colony; and
5.

secure and fortify the site for execution of their

strategic plans.

41

An issue to be discussed below, p. 55.
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Lifeline to the New Colony: The Corridor's Road System
The Spartans had two basic choices for a route to Doris
and the proposed site of Herakleia. One route to the new
colony could begin at the north coast of the Peloponnese, from
which a short ferry trip across the Corinthian Gulf would lead
to the south terminus of the Corridor at Kirrha. 42
Although Athens was mistress of the sea throughout the
Archidamian War, 43 Sparta's numerous allies with about 100
triremes, most of which were Corinthian-built for the Korkyran
campaign, made the Lakedaimonian fleet a significant force 44
(Busolt GGIII 2 863-864; Hammond 1986:345}. Spartan influence
was especially dominant in the eastern Corinthian Gulf. Athens
had relinquished Pegai, Megara's port on the Corinthian Gulf,
to Sparta in 446 under the terms of the Thirty Years Peace
0

In 457, the Spartans, going to Doris to assist against
a Phokian invasion (1.107.1-2; Died. 2.79}, most probably made
a sea crossing from the Peloponnese to Kirrha (Gemme
1956a:314; Ste. Croix 1972:190-95; Szemler GICR 116; contra
Hammond 1986:294). This same route was probably used by the
Spartans in the Second Sacred War in 449 (1.112.5}. After 429,
the Athenian naval base at Naupaktos dominated the western end
of the Corinthian Gulf and, undoubtedly, the Rhion-Antirhion
crossing, ca. 9 km to the southwest of Naupaktos. A
disembarkation point in Central Greece further east of
Naupaktos would be a necessity for the Spartans.
43

At the beginning of the War Athens had a fleet of 300
triremes, aside from those furnished by Chics, Lesbos and
Korkyra (2.13.8; Bengtson 1988:137}.
44

Although Athens' base at Naupaktos and Phormio's
brilliant victories in 429 may have dashed the hopes of the
Spartans at sea and restricted their passage from the Gulf to
the Ionian sea (Hammond 1986:355; contra Kelly 1987:25-54},
there is no evidence that within the eastern half of the Gulf
traffic was seriously affected by the Athenian victories.
24

(1.115~1).

seven

Corinth, Sikyon and Pellene in Achaia, three of the

allies

of

peloponnesian fleet
corinthian Gulf. 45

Sparta

who

{2. 9. 3),

furnished

ships

for

the

were situated in the eastern

Thus, we must assume that Lakedaimonian

troops could be ferried safely across the Gulf to Kirrha and
to the Corridor's road system from more than one location on
the north-eastern coast of the Peloponnese.
An

alternate

route

transfer across the Gulf,
possibly dangerous,

for

avoiding

the

would be a re la ti vely long,

and

overland

the

Spartans,

journey through the Megarid,

Boiotia and Phokis (or from the Megarid into Attica and then
into Boiotia),

and then,

along the Kephissos river to the

Dorian metropolis.
Since the Megarid is the only gateway by land from the
Peloponnese to Central Greece,

its strategic importance to

both sides cannot be exaggerated. 46

Mt. Geraneia stretches

45

Pellene, the easternmost of the twelve Achaian cities
and a neighbor to Sikyon, had become an ally of Sparta at the
beginning of the Archidamian War. It often acted independently
of the other Achaian cities and on other occasions sided with
Corinth and Sikyon {Gemme 1956b:lO). By 429 Oyme, the
westernmost city of Achaia, had probably also joined the
Spartans. Knemos' ships fled to Dyme following Phormio's naval
victory {2.84.4; Paus. 7.6.1), suggesting that the city was
friendly to the Spartans (Gomme 1956b:219). The rest of the
Achaians, although neutral at the beginning of the war, later
sided with the Lakedaimonians {2.9.2).
46

It was the friendship of Megara with Sparta that
determined the plans of campaign of both sides at the
beginning of the war (Henderson 1927:4). It has been suggested
that the Megarian Decrees of 432 were intended by Athens as an
economic weapon to force Megara to resume her alliance with
Athens. For a discussion of different views on this matter,
see Kagan 1969:260-264, esp. n. 36).
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athwart this peninsula, a distance of about eight miles, from
the Corinthian Gulf on the northwest to the Saronic Gulf on
the southeast. This range,

with ridges as high as 1200 m,

forms a relatively easily defensible boundary separating the
Megarid from Corinth.u

Megara had been an ally of Athens

since 460, when, threatened by Corinth, she turned to Athens
for support (1.103.4; Hammond 1986:292).

The alliance with

Megara, the first step in the so-called First Peloponnesian
war,

afforded

Peloponnese. 48

Athens

protection

from

invasions

from

the

Following Athens' defeat at Koroneia in 447,

47

There are only three routes, other than mule paths,
that traverse this range. On the northwest a coastal road
follows the Corinthian Gulf around the west end of the
mountains to Pegai, the port of Megara, whence it continues
north to Aigosthena, also on the gulf, and then into Boiotia.
On the south another route follows the precipitous coast of
the Saronic Gulf along the Skironian Way around the east end
of the Geraneia range to Megara, whence it continues along the
coast to Eleusis in Attica. Only one route goes through the
Geraneia range by a pass leading to Tripodiskos from where
there is an easy passage to Megara (Henderson 1927:55-56).
48

It was at this time that Athens built the Long Walls
from Megara to Nisaia. By controlling Pegai on the Corinthian
Gulf and Megara, passage through the Geraneia range could be
interdicted (Henderson 1927:56). When Sparta intervened in
Central Greece in 457 to aid Doris, Sparta was barred from
returning to the Peloponnese via the Megarid, because Athens
held Pegai and Megara and picketed the pass in the Geraneia
mountains. Sparta was forced to retreat to Boiotia (1.108.1).
Pegai also furnished Athens a base to extend her influence in
the Corinthian Gulf.
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Megara revolted from Athenian domination (1.114.1). 49

After

the Thirty Years' Peace in 446/445, Athens was also forced to
surrender Pegai and Nisaia. As the prospects of continued war
with Sparta ballooned, a renewed Athenian control of Megara
became a strategic necessity.

The corridor's south sector50
Both the overland route via the Megarid,
Phokis,

as well

Boiotia, and

as the sea route through Kirrha,

had to

converge through the Central Sector of the Great Isthmus
Corridor, 51
1986:361;

the

only

Kase

GICR

expedient
21-22).

way

The

to

city

Doris
of

(Hammond

Kytinion

in

particular, situated in southeast Doris, occupied an eminently

49

The Megarians revolted, while Perikles was putting
down the revolt in Euboia. The Five Year Peace with Sparta had
just expired, and with the Megarid open to them, the Spartans
invaded and ravaged Attica. King Pleistoanax and his troops
advanced as far as the Thriasian plains, but withdrew upon
Perikles' return from Euboia. (1.114; Diod. 12.5; Plut. Per.
22.1-2).
so The topographic designations of PDE (Kase GICR 21) will
be used throughout. The South Sector of the Corridor route
extended ca. 29 linear km from the Gulf of Itea and the plain
of Krissa on the south to the Gravia pass on the north.
Passing Amphissa the road continued by the low Mouchikri pass
to the Vinianni valley and then through the Ambliani pass
before reaching Gravia (Kase & Szemler 1982:356).
51

The Central Sector of the Corridor extended from the
pass at Gravia (between the Parnassos and the Ghiona
mountains) on the south to the modern village of Oiti on the
north and encompassed the upper Kephissos river valley, i.e.
ancient Doris (Kase GICR 21-22).
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strategic position on the Phokian-Dorian frontier. 52 Sparta's
new strategy required control of Kytinion and its environs to
maintain the stability of the Corridor route through Central
Greece to Herakleia.
If the Spartans chose the short ferry ride across the
Gulf, the route would be quicker, safer, tactically brilliant
and unexpected and,

thus, more decisive.

Furthermore,

from

Krissa they could pass unhindered through the South Sector of
the Corridor to Doris. Amphissa, the dominant city in Ozolian
Lokris,

was

a

Spartan

ally

(Died.

12.42.4);

thus,

the

allegiance of most of the Ozolian Lokrians to Athens (Gemme
1956b:ll) would not be a significant impediment to passage
through the South Sector and the deployment of Spartan forces
in Doris and Oitaia. 53

52

Kytinion, identified as the local site of Tsouka
Khlomou, is located about 1 km north of the pass at Gravia,
guarding the entrance to this pass and controlling both of the
routes which pass through Doris (Wallace GICR 53/54; Hammond
1986: 361). The importance of this site in relation to the
Corridor and the affairs in Central Greece is attested in
ancient history (e.g., as the target of Phokian aggression in
457, 1.107.2; and a target of Philip II's campaign in Central
Greece in 339, Aeschin.
3.140; Dem. 18-169-179; Died.
16.84.1).
The importance of this site for the
control of the
Corridor is demonstrated by the campaigns of Demosthenes in
Central Greece in 426 (3.94.2-3.98) discussed below.
53

In 426 Eurylochos had no trouble in getting the
Myonians, Ipneans, Messapians, Tolophonians, Eupaliones,
Oineones, and other Ozolian Lokrian tribes, to cooperate with
him in his campaign against Naupaktos, subduing some and
taking hostages in others to get them out of their Athenian
alliances (3.101.2; Hornblower 1991:515/516).
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The Corridor' Central Sector
obviously,

the

Spartans must

have

been aware

of the

obstacles with which, at any time, they might be confronted in
their passage through the Megarid,

Boiotia and Phokis. The

Phokians' attitude toward any such Spartan move was especially
critical. The tribal state of Phokis extended westward from
soiotia

along the Kephissos river to Dor is. 54

Within this

land-locked valley in Phokis, wedged between Mt. Parnassos on
the south and Mt. Kallidromos on the north, the overland route
via the Megarid and Boiotia made its way westward to join the
Great Isthmus Corridor route. 55
Phokis had a longstanding friendship with Athens which
began shortly after the Persian War. 56

At the outbreak of

54

The Catalogue of Ships attests to the unity of the
Phokians, but also to the existence of numerous cities (Il.
2.517-23). To the Phokian tribal state cf. Schober 1924:55.
Before the Thessalian conquest, and probably stimulated by it,
in the seventh and sixth centuries, there is Phokian
representation in the Amphiktyonic League (Larsen 1967:43-44).
The minting of Phokian coinage suggests a federal organization
(Head 1911:338). No single city dominated the whole (Larsen
1967:43), but each reserved some independence of action.
55

The overland route through Phokis joined the Great
Isthmus Corridor route in Doris, ca. 1 km south of the modern
village of Oiti (Kase GICR 30).
56

The Phokians had allied themselves with the Athenians,
as "the acclaimed winners at Sestos, the new, powerful star of
the Aegean" (Szemler GICR 116). In 457 following the battle of
Oinophytai, Myronides subdued the whole of Phokis, as well as
Opuntian Lokris (1.108.3; Died. 11.83.2), an indication that
perhaps this early alliance had eroded. In 454/453 Phokis,
prompted by her enmity to Sparta, Thebes and Thessaly (Hammond
1986: 396), concluded another alliance with Athens (Kagan
1969:120). In 449, in the Sacred War, Sparta intervened in
Central Greece and took control of the sacred precinct of
29

the peloponnesian War, however, Phokis was allied with Sparta
(Diod.

2. 9. 3) • 57

12.42.4;1.9.2;

confederation

had

no

central

Since

control,

this

the

Phokian

alliance

was

tenuous. The western Phokians might at any time rejoin Athens
if the opportunity arose

(3.95.1) , 58

or Phokian aggression

might at any time expand into the central Sector and def eat
Sparta's plans.

For the Spartans to maintain uninterrupted

control of the Corridor's Central Sector it was necessary to
keep the Phokians in check, either by alliance or force. This
factor greatly influenced military events in Central Greece
after the Archidamian War began.
In response to the destructive Spartan raids on Attica,
and after Spartan troops withdrew to winter quarters, Athens
cautiously began invading the Megarid, once or twice a year
Apollo from the Phokians and delivered it to the Delphians.
Athens then, in 447, in a show of strength, restored the
temple to the Phokians (1.112.5). Athenian influence in the
area continued, even extending to the capture of Chaironeia in
Boiotia (Hammond 1986: 308). After the decisive defeat of
Athens at Koroneia
in 446,
Athenian aspirations
for
continental power in Central Greece ended. She was forced to
evacuate Boiotia and, without Boiotia, Phokis, as well as
Opuntian Lokris, became untenable (Kagan 1969:124). In these
circumstances Phokis was forced to join the Spartan League
soon after the conclusion of the Thirty Years' Treaty between
Sparta and Athens (Hammond 1986:311).
57

The geographical isolation of Phokis and its exposure
to the growing Boiotian influence had strengthened Sparta's
hand in gaining this alliance (Gomme 1956b:402).
~ The split in allegiance between eastern and western
Phokians was demonstrated in the third century, when the
eastern Phokians allied with Antigonos Doson in 224 and with
Philip V in 219, while the western Phokians, allied with the
Aitolians, blocked the Dhema-Thermopylai defensive line (Pol.
2.52.7; Larsen 1968:19-20).
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( 2 .31.:3;4.66.1; Gemme 1956b:93). Since these annual raids into
the

Megarid

retreated

to

occurred
the

only

after

Peloponnese,

Athenian hoplites,

the

there

Spartan
was

no

armies
risk

to

had
the

nor any inconsistency with the declared

periklean strategy of fighting a defensive war.
Thukydides does not give us any explanation for these
military actions or raids, but evidence suggests a purpose
other than mere harassment. The 431 invasion, for instance,
involved

the

largest

army

of

Athenians

ever

assembled

(2.31.2). The size of this army belies a purpose limited to
the devastation of

the Megarian countryside. 59

Continued

aggressive military action in the Megarid suggests that Athens
must have been aware of Sparta's new strategic plans, probably
through its spies or contacts at Delphi.
After

the

death

of

Perikles

in

429,

these

raids

intensified. His absence from the strategia appears to have
strengthened
action. 60

the

role

of

the

faction

seeking

aggressive

In fact, between 429 and 426 Athens abandoned her

59

Other explanations offered for the campaigns are
sanctions imposed against Megara for religious misdeeds and a
grudge entertained by Perikles against the city (Plut. Per.
30.2-3; Adcock, CAH 5:198-99).
60

Some scholars state that a change in the membership of
the strategia in 426 put the war faction in control (West
1924:201; Beloch 1931:324). Others have suggested that the
strategia in 426/25 had the same mixture of radicals and
moderates as in previous years, and that the change in
strategy was due not to politics but to policy (Gomme
1956b:195; Kagan 1974:187-88; Bengtson 1988;141).
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strategy of attrition,

the

"Ermattungs-strategie" of Hans

oelbrilck (Delbrilck, 1957:139 ff.) in favor of more aggressive
•

•

policies.

61

Athenian

tactical

moves

suggest

such

an

awareness.
In 427 Athens captured the island of Minoa,

taking a

major, decisive step to regain control of the Megarid. 62

The

island was

garrisoned,

the

Corinthian

Gulf,

was

and

Nisaia,

Megara's

effectively

port

blockaded

on

{Hammond

1986:360) . 63
But Sparta did not remain inactive. Under the command of
Archidamos, the Spartans attacked Plataiai in 429 {2.71.1),
probably about the
Herakleia.

same time when

Thukydides

gives

no

they decided to

reason

why

the

found

Spartans

61

Among the aggressive campaigns of Athens in this period
were the quelling of the revolt in Mytelene (3 .18. 4-5);
intervention in Sicily to aid Leontini (3.88); the garrison at
Minoa (3.51); intervention in Korkyra (3.69-85); attack on
Melos and the Lokrian coast (3.91); Demosthenes in Leukas and
Aitolia (3.94-98); defeat of Peloponnesians at Olpai (3.105115).
62

Minoa, now a hill on the mainland, but in the fifth
century an island at the entrance to the harbor of Nisaia, was
captured by Nikias. The use of the island as a watch station
for traffic in and out of Nisaia is the only reason Thukydides
gives for the Athenian action (3.51).
63

In 424, two years after Herakleia was founded, and
while Brasidas' armies were preparing for a march to Thrace,
Athens
captured
Nisaia,
again
resuming
a
campaign,
unsuccessfully, to gain control of the Megarid. Since the
Athenians had believed erroneously that the capture of this
port would compel the surrender of Megara ( 4. 69 .1), the
Athenians did not pursue the invasion of the Megarid (2.31.3).
Megara, however, remained allied with Sparta, and passage to
Central Greece through Megara's land routes remained open to
the Lakedaimonian armies.
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undertook this protracted siege to capture the city, but its
importance for the free passage of Spartan armies to Central
Greece must not be overlooked.M
Plataiai is situated on the north slope of the Kithairon
range which,

continuous with the Parnes range to the east,

forms the border between Boiotia on the north and Attica and
the Megarid on the south. Any troop movements into Boiotia
from Attica would be exposed to a flank attack at Plataiai. 65
The only other road which enters Boiotia from the south
follows the coast of the Corinthian Gulf from the Megarid
around the west end of the Kithairon range, and it is also

M
The strategic importance of the site has been
generally accepted {Grundy 1901:110-116; Busolt 1926:964;
especially, Henderson 1927:73-74; Adcock, CAH 5:211). Kagan,
conceding its importance, states there is no evidence that
control by Athens would disrupt Sparta's communication with
Boiotia, and he concludes that Sparta's need for such a land
campaign was doubtful {1974:102-3). Grote suggests a desire
for revenge against Plataiai for the execution of Theban
prisoners (2.6.4) caused Sparta to act (1907:6.213). J.B. Bury
states Plataiai commanded the road from Megara to Thebes
{1963: 410).

M There are only three passes through these mountains
suitable for troop movements from Attica into Boiotia:
Dekalea, on the route from Athens to Oropos on the Euripos;
Phyle, running northwesterly, and the most direct route from
Athens to Thebes; and Dryoskephalai, which pierces the
Ki thairon range into Boiotia about eight miles south of
Thebes. Plataiai is situated on a junction road a few miles to
the west of the Dryoskephalai pass. The important defensive
outposts of Attica, Cine and Eleuthera, are si tuate.d on this
route a few miles to the south of the pass.
_,,.<{(,•\\ '· 1
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66
exposed to attack from Plataiai.

through
•

phokis,

67

the

relatively

and then up

through Phokis to

narrow

The road from Boiotia led
pass

at

Parapotamioi

the valley of the Kephissos

to

river

join the Central Sector of the Corridor

route ca. 1 km south of the modern village of Oiti (Kase GICR
30) •
The concern of Sparta was not to garrison Plataiai with
hoplites, but to insure that Athens' loyal ally would not be
able to off er assistance in any venture Athens might undertake
in central Greece against Sparta.~
66

This is the only road into Boiotia that does not pass
through Attica. It passes through Pegai and Aigosthenai in the
Megarid and enters Boiotia near Kreusis about eight miles to
the west of Plataiai. Hammond makes the unlikely suggestion
that the route was used by the Spartans in 457 when they
marched into Central Greece to settle the Dorian-Phokian
conflict (Hammond 1986:294).
Kleombrotos may have used it
when he withdrew from Boiotia (Xen. Hel. 5. 4. 20), and the
Spartans after their defeat at Leuktra in 371 (Xen. Hel.
6.4.26). A hostile army entering Boiotia from this road and
approaching Thebes would encounter the Plataians head on; an
army headed northwesterly into western Boiotia, or to the
Kephissos valley beyond, would be exposed to a flank attack at
Thisbe or Leuktra.
67

Strabo gives a full description of the position of
Parapotamioi (Strabo 9.3.16). The site has been located at
modern Belesi on a mound dominating the pass through which the
Kephissos river flows from the main basin at Elateia in Phokis
to the first plain of Boiotia at Khaironeia, a distance ca. 7
km to the south (Fossey 1986:69-71).
~ Before commencing hostilities King Archidamos proposed
that the Plataians avoid any assault on their city by
maintaining their neutrality both to Athens and to Sparta
(2. 72 .1). Archidamos even suggested the Spartans would hold in
trust for the Plataians, until the war was over, all their
lands, buildings, and fruit trees ( 2. 72. 3) • There is no
evidence that Sparta was not sincere in this overture (contra
Kagan 1974:104). Plataiai was finally sacked in 427, the city
razed, and the land incorporated into the territory of Thebes,
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The corridor's North sector
Herakleia was planned to be built in the environs of the
North Sector of the Corridor route, which extended from the
modern village of Oiti (Gardhikaki) and the east-wese ridge
forming the south watershed of the Asopos Basin on the south,
to the modern village of Kostalexi in the Malian plain on the
north, a distance of ca. 15 km (Kase GICR 27-31). From the
village of Oiti the road system provided an easy and gradual
descent

across

the

potentially hostile Oitaian territory,

skirting the formidable citadel of Kastro Orias, 69 to arrive,
at a distance of six km,

at the Dhema Gap. 70

The pass at

Dhema, controlled at various times by different ethne, was the
only feasible passage between the Isthmus Corridor road system
and the Malian Gulf. From the Malian Gulf two roads approached

a Spartan ally (3.68).
69

Kastro Orias is comparable in extent and defensibility
to Acrocorinth (Wallace GICR 49). A suggested identification
of the site is ancient Homilai (Philippson 1950:335-36). The
site most likely was an Oitaian stronghold (Szemler GICR 81,
83-86).

ro The Dhema Gap or Pass, located ca. 300 m south of Kato
Ohio Vouna, is about 500 m long by 50 m wide (the actual
stenon measured at 18.20, + 0.50 m Kase GICR 25) and formed
by the westernmost end of the Trachinian cliffs and the
easternmost end of Mt. Oite (Mt. Tsouka). The mountain stream
of the Xirias river bisects the pass and its valley furnishes
a route for access (Cherf GICR 56; 1983:5, 23-30). PDE has
established that the Dhema pass was "the pass through Trachis"
of Herodotos (Hdt. 7.176.2; Kase GICR 23-25; Kase & szemler
1982:356-62).
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ohema, merging into one road just south of Kato Ohio Vouna
before entering the pass. 71
Less than 0.3 km south of the Dhema pass, a secondary
road branched off the main Corridor roadway and ascended ESE
to the upland Pergara plain located south of the Trachinian
cliffs and connected
cliffs,

only

5

km

with the north escarpment of these

away.

Herakleia would be founded.

It

was

upon

these

cliffs

that

The topographic details of the

"Herakleia roadway" will be discussed below. The connection of
this roadway to the Isthmus Corridor route insured Herakleia
its enormous strategic and tactical importance.

stabilization of the North sector
As a first step in implementing the new strategic plans,
Sparta had to stabilize the recalcitrant belligerents of the
North Sector. By the fifth century distinct tribal units with
definable territories and boundaries occupied this sector,
contesting for control of Dhema and its environs (Szemler GICR
83). The friction among these tribes along the frontier zones
for control of the fertile upland plains and the strategically
important

Dhema

pass

made

the

71

North

Sector

unstable

and

One road, approaching from the modern village of
Vardhates, 2.5 km to the east, crossed the plain of Vardhates,
continued westward through the narrow gorge of the Xirias
river, piercing a ridge, ca. 80 m high, to the west of and
above the modern town of Kato Ohio Vouna. A second road,
approaching from Franzi, crossed the Gorgopotamos river and,
continuing for 4 km, ascended the foothills of Oite to the
village of Kato Ohio Vouna.
36

incompatible with

a

secure

and

reliable

all-purpose

road

system. Before Sparta could establish its colony at Herakleia
these tribes had to be pacified and brought under Spartan
control.

Among

these

tribes

were

the

Dorians,

Oitaians,

Malians and Ainianes.n
Oitaians
The Oitaians,

a

loose association of mountain people,

occupied a land-locked territory centered around their central
cult place on Pyra, near the fountainhead of the Gorgopotamos
river and the watersheds between the Mornos and the Asopos and
the Mornos and the Kephissos rivers. Their domain, enclosed by
the

Tsouka

massif

in

the

north

and

the

Xerovouni

and

Katavothra on the west,~ was hemmed in by the Dorians on the
southeast, the Phokians on the northeast, and the Malians and
Ainianes on the north and northwest.
On the east and southeast, a wide erosion area, which
included the upper Kephissos valley and the Central Sector of
the Corridor, constituted a triple border where the Dorian,
Malian and Oitaian frontier zones, as well as those of the

n For an exhaustive discussion of the tribes in the North
Sector and their territories (Philipson 1950:334 ff.; Szemler
GICR 74-89).
~ The northwestern frontier ran from Ano Ohio Vouna,
situated south of and above the Dhema gap, thence southeast
across the Pergara plain where it turned SSE along the Skatias
gorge, including within its domain Kouvela and Kastro Orias
(Wallace 1980:18/19). Crossing the Asopos river and following
its western branch (Karnaria), the frontier zone probably
extended SSW between Kalivia Eleftherochoriou and the modern
village of oiti (Gardhikaki) (Szemler GICR 99),
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oorian;

Malian

and

Phokian,

met,

the

podeon

steinos

of

aerodotos {Szemler GICR 83, 99). These border zones must have
brought

the

neighbors.

Oitaians

into continuous

Significantly,

before

the

conflict with their
fifth

century

the

oitaians controlled a greater part of the Corridor's routes
from above the Dhema Gap to its descent to the upper Kephissos
valley (Szemler GICR 84).
Malians

The Malians~ occupied the south and western rim of the
Malian Gulf from Antikyra in the west as far as Alpenos of the
Lokrians in the east {Gemme 1956b:395; Szemler GICR 78). The
watershed of the Tsoukes and Portes mountains to the south of
the Gulf probably represented the south frontier of their
territory. 75

Their frontiers bordered on the Oitaians to the

southwest, the Dorians to the southeast and the Ainianes to
the northwest. The Trachinians, a division of the Malians,
occupied

the

Trachinian cliffs,

upon

which Herakleia was

founded,

and the alluvial fans of the Melas (modern Xirias)

74

According to Thukydides the Malians consisted of three
divisions: the Paralians, Hieraians and Trachinians (3.92.2).
The Paralians and Hieraians, judging from their name, must
have been located along the Malian Gulf and at the religious
site of Anthele, respectively. The Trachinians probably
occupied the upper reaches of the Trachinian cliffs {Macan
1908:1.297: Gemme 1956b 394; Hornblower 1991:503).
75

From Elafopedema the south frontier of the Malians
probably ran NNW, skirting Kastro Orias, and Kouvela, and
descended north across the Pergara plain to the Xirias gorge.
Thence to the Dhema Gap and Kato Dhio Vouna (Szemler GICR 81).
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and the Asopos rivers below (Bequignon 1937:346-48; Szemler
GICR 77/78) •
Ainianes
The Ainianes were located within the open and relatively
defenseless middle and upper Spercheios valley west of Stavros
(Beki) (Szemler GICR 82), and connected only peripherally with
the Corr id or. 76

Their expansion to the south would place

them into the North Sector of the Corridor in conflict with
the Malians. The road leading to the Dhema pass from the north
went through the territory of the Ainianes and fits Pausanias'
description of the road taken by the Persians in 480 and the
Celts in 279. 77
We do not know who actually controlled the Dhema pass at
the

beginning

of

the

Archidamian

War.

It

appears

from

Herodotos that the Malians controlled the pass at the time of
the Persian invasions (Hdt 7.201; Szemler GICR 82). If the
Malians still controlled Dhema and its environs fifty years
later, when Sparta undertook to found its colony, then, the

~

Herodotos describes Antikyra as the first Malian city
one encounters from the country of the Ainianes (Hdt.
7.198.1). The Ainianes, along with the Dolopians, Thessalians
and others, had submitted to Xerxes before his arrival at
Thermopylai (Hdt. 7.132). Their frontier would extend SSE from
Antikyra along the foothills of Mt. Oite toward Franzi and
then south to the Gorgopotamos river, Ohio Vouna and the Dhema
pass. Thence, it turned west over Tsouka and Xerovouni.
77

Pausanias informs us that the road Hydarnes took, and
later followed by the Celts, was not the steep way over Mt.
Cite, but the easier way, more passable for an army, through
the land of the Ainianes (Paus. 10.22.8). Cf. Szemler GICR 83.
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Spartans,

as the saviors of the Malians,

could easily have

substituted their own authority in the area. If the pass in
426 was controlled by the Oitaians,

Sparta's subduing the

oitains would have placed the pass in Sparta's hands.
Delphi's Role
Before taking action the Spartans, true to tradition,
consulted Delphi. 78 The oracle gave approval and colonists
were sent out

(3.92.5).

Invitations to join the enterprise

were extended throughout Hellas (3.92.5). Diodoros Sikoulos
informs us of a population of 10,000: 4,000 Spartans and other
Peloponnesians and 6,000 other Greeks (12.59). Although the
numbers

are

foundation

of

questionable 79
the

colony

even
would

if
be

scaled
a

major

down,

the

enterprise,

demanding time and careful coordination of logistics.
Oikists
The

stipulations

and

terms under which

a

colony was

founded by a mother city were customarily memorialized by

n Consultation of the oracle was obligatory before the
foundation of a colony (Hdt. 5. 42. 2; Parke and .Wormell I
1956:49; A. Misiou, Thoukididou Seigraphei 1958:414). The
procedures were very technical and ritualistic. Responses of
the oracle were given only at dawn on the seventh day of each
month, except the three winter months (Parke and Wormell I
1956:30).
79

These numbers have been criticized as impossibly large
(Beloch Bevolkerung 1927:512).
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inscription on a stele. 80

Unfortunately,

no such stele or

foundation decree is extant for Herakleia. Our only sources
are Thukydides (3.92 ff.) and, four centuries later, Diodoros
sikoulos (12.59.3-5). We are informed that the founders of the
colony were three Lakedaimonians: Leon, Alkidas and Damagon
(3.92.5-6) • 81
Leon was

a

well

known historical

figure.

He

had an

illustrious political and social career in Sparta in the last
half

of

the

fifth

century. 82 Alkidas

had

extensive

naval

experience; he is depicted by Thukydides as incompetent and

°

8

For example, an inscribed bronze plaque c. 500-475 (?)
by Hypoknemedian Lokrians for the establishment of a colony at
Naupaktos (Meiggs & Lewis, no. 20=Tod 24). The foundation of
Brea by Athens c. 445 is the subject of two fragments of a
marble stele (Meiggs & Lewis, no. 49=Tod 44) • Cf. Graham
1964:25 ff ..
81

Cf. P. Poralla, Prosographie der Lakedaimonier, Studia
Historica 1966:18, 41,83-84.
82

In 440 his horses were victorious at Olympia (Eustath.
ad Hom. Il. 2.852). In 421 he was recruited as an ambassador
to Athens to settle disputes. Eponymous ephor for the year
419/18. (Xen. Hell. 2.3.10). In 411 assisted the Chians in
their naval battle against Athens (8.61.1-3). His son,
Pedaritos appointed governor of Chics in 412/12 (8.28.5). His
son, Antalkidas,was instrumental in the Peace with Persia in
387 (Plut. Artax. 21.5).
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. 83

savage.

There is no

further

information about Damagon,

except this one reference in Thukydides (Graham 1964:38).
The Spartans chose with care. Leon would lend dignity and
prestige to make Herakleia a great city

(Died.

12.59)

by

welding the colonists into a new united population and thereby
underscoring

to

the

other

Greeks

the

importance

of

the

enterprise. Alkidas might have been appointed to take charge
of the building of the docks at Herakleia or, as Gomme has
suggested, his appointment might have been the reward of an
easy post in the aristocratic manner in view of his avowed
incompetency (Gomme 1956b:395 n. 4). A reasonable interval for
the accomplishment of these tasks would be two or three years.
Accordingly, the decision by Sparta to found Herakleia may
safely be placed to the third year of the Archidamian War.
i.e. 429/428.

83

In 427 he was dispatched with 40 ships to render
assistance to Mytelene in her revolt against Athens. By
"loitering on the way" (3.27.1 tr. C.F. Smith) his mission
failed. On his return voyage home he butchered most of his
captives (3.32). When near Ephesus he sighted two Athenian
triremes, he "sailed in haste and took to flight" (3.31.1).
When he was dispatched to Korkyra to assist an oligarchic coup
d'etat, he won a naval victory due more to the enemy's
incompetence than to his own skills (Adcock CAH 5:221). He
failed to follow up the naval victory the next day (despite
the urging of his subordinate, Brasidas), and set sail for
home upon learning that an Athenian fleet was approaching
(3.81.1).
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The New Colony and Its Relation to Trachis
Thukydides
Trachis,

locates

the

site

of

Herakleia

in Malian

forty stadia84 from Thermopylai and twenty stadia

from the sea (3.92.6). The territory of Trachis extended from
the Spercheios river up to, but not including the kome of
Anthele, 85

along the ridges of the mountains to the south,

between the alluvial fans of the Melas (now the Xirias) and
the Asopos rivers. 86

According to Herodotos,

the Asopos

gorge hemmed in the Trachinian territory on the south (Hdt.
7.199). The location of Herakleia must be sought, therefore,
within this sweep of land, ca. 2.5 km, running NW from the
Asopos gorge along the Trachinian cliffs.
Diodoros

Sikoulos 87

Strabo88

and

furnish

additional

information to pinpoint the locus of Herakleia by describing
the site in relation to ancient Trachis city, presumably the
tribal center of Trachinia. The location of Trachis city,

84

For the metric equivalent of a stade our study will use
a mean measure of 172.14 meters. Cf. Jilthner RE 3A:1961-62;
Szemler GICR 100 n. 34.
85

If Thukydides (3.92.2) is correct, an issue we may
securely assume, Anthele was controlled by the Hieraians. Cf.
Gomme 1956b:394.
86

Szemler GICR 77/78. See also footnote 73 above.

87

Diodoros Sikoulos states that the Lakedaimonians
colonized Trachis and renamed it Herakleia (Diod. 12.59.3),
presumably assuming that the Spartan colony was founded on the
same site.
~ Strabo describes Herakleia as in earlier times having
been called Trachin, and he locates the city at a distance of
about six stades from the old Trachin (Strabo 9.4.13)~
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therefore, becomes the key for establishing the site of the
city of Herakleia.
The location of both Herakleia and Trachis city depends
mainly on the identification of the Melas river, 89
according to Herodotos,

which,

was reached by the Persians

five

stades before their arrival at Trachis. He informs us that the
Persians in 480 marched twenty stades from Antikyra on the
spercheios

river

to

reach

the

Dyras

river

(modern

Gorgopotamos), and from the Dyras another twenty stades to the
Melas river (modern Xirias). Five stades' distance beyond the
Melas the Persians passed the city of Trachis, built at the
widest point between the mountains and the sea (Hdt. 7.198-9).
Some observers,

agreeing that Trachis,

located on the

foothills of the cliffs adjacent to the actual route taken by
Xerxes

to

Thermopylai,

have

Herodotos'

directions. 90

Others

failed
have

to

follow

assumed

correctly

that

Trachis

89

The generally accepted identification of the modern
Xirias with the Melas of Herodotos is critical to this
assessment (Grundy 1901:282; Hignett 1963:360; Szemler GICR
80-81). A problem is that the Melas may be one of two streams
now called Mavroneria. Stahlin (RE 5A:204) identified the
Mavroneri, a tributary of Mavroneria, and flowing from
Trachinian cliffs as the Melas. Bequignon (1937:64) identifies
Stahlin' s Mavroneri with the Xirias, contra Pritchett who
locates the Melas at springs only 0.90 km north of Herakleia
and identifies the Xirias, rather than the Gorgopotamos, as
the most likely candidate for Herodotos' Dyras (Pritchett
1985:201-202 n. 15). Harmening (in Kromayer-Veith i903-30:2425) and Gomme (1956b:396) followed Herodotos' measurements
from the Xirias in fixing the site of Trachis.
90

Bequignon (1937:243-244) placed Malian Trachis in the
plain south of Moustafa Bey at modern Hiraklion Trachinion,
north of the Asopos' exit from the gorge (near Aghia
Paraskevi). He concluded that Mycenaean Trachis was located on
44

city

was

removed

from

Xerxes'

route. 91

Only

a

few

have

followed the directions of Herodotos precisely in locating
Trachis five stades beyond the Melas river. 92
The topographical and archaeological evidence, supported
by the literary sources, suggests that a distinct promontory,

the hilly ground above, and when the Malians later entered
the area of the Malian gulf, Mycenaean Trachis became the
acropolis of Malian Trachis (Bequignon 1937:257; Gomme
1956b:396).
Pritchett has located Trachis at the base of Bequignon's
Skliphomeli ravine, 0.90 km south of a mountain spring which
Pritchett incorrectly identified as the source of the Melas
and from which he concluded Herodotos took his measurements
(Pritchett 1985:201-204).
Leake concluded that the Trachis of Herodotos occupied
the low ground between the Mavroneria (Xirias) and the
Karvunaria rivers
(Asopos)
(Leake II,
1967:29). Munro
concluded that the Trachis of Herodotos occupied the low
ground and that only after Herakleia, originally founded on
the same site, moved up the hill in later centuries, did the
lower town, six stades below, become exclusively known as
Trachis (Munro JHS 22 1902:313).
Stahlin placed Trachis six stades out on the alluvial fan
below the Trachinian cliffs, in the area of modern Hiraklion
Trachinion (Stahlin H.T 208 and RE 6A:1863 ff.).
Pausanias
refers to the ruins of Trachis at the end of a path past
Herakleia (10.22.1), suggesting to one observer that in 426
Trachis was abandoned and became the acropolis of Herakleia
(Levi, 1971:263 n. 631). Cf. Szemler GICR 76-77.
91

Grundy (1901:264-,283) concluded not only that
Herakleia was at a different site than Trachis, but he
suggested Trachis was in the Kastro-Orias-Kouvela area, as the
crow flies, five km south of Vardhates. The site has never
been securely identified (Harmening A.S. 25 n. 2). Kolias,
EEBS 10:80-81
(1933);
Lolling 1989:135; see Bequignon
1937:254).
92

Harmening in Kromayer-Veith 1903-30: 24-25. See Szemler
GICR 80.
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named Rakhi ta, 93 about 18 m above the Malian plain and ca.
1.5 km WNW of the Asopos gorge is the most likely site of the
Malian Trachis of 480 B.C., as well as of the Homeric Trachis
of Achilles~ (Szemler GICR 80). The distance from Rakhita to
vardhates, the outlet for the Xirias river (Herodotos' Melas)
is

ca.

850

m.

This

measurement

accords

with

Herodotos'

statement that Trachis was five stades (860.7 m) beyond the
Melas river. Late Mycenaean pottery found at this location and
a cist grave (L.H. III A-B)

in nearby Vardhates confirm the

early occupation of the area (Simpson and Lazenby 1959:103104; Wallace GICR 48). From its proximity to Vardhates Trachis
would control access to the Corridor (Szemler GICR 81) . 95

93

A toponym with a probable Slavic origin (Rosser GICR

146).
~ The Catalogue of Ships included the men of Trachis as
part of the contingent under Achilles' command (Il. 2.681.5).
That the kingdom of Peleus was centered in the Spercheios
valley is established (Simpson and Lazenby 1959:102). Some
scholars have raised doubts whether there ever was a Homeric
Trachis. Others question whether Herodotos' city was a
continuation of the Homeric city, and, despite the explicit
distances given by Strabo, locate the Trachis of Herodotos
within Spartan Herakleia For a detailed discussion cf. Szemler
GICR 78.
95

Since the sea extended to the base of Kallidromos in
the Mycenaean period, there was no passage at Thermopylai at
that time (Kraft GICR Chap. I). Trachis controlled the only
access to Central Greece. The coast line in that period was
not as far west and along the Trachinian cliffs as in ca. 4500
B.P. (Kraft GICR Fig 1-1 to 1-10), but it had to be further
west than appears in contemporary maps. It was probably north
and west of Moschohori in the south and just north of Frantzi
in the west (Szemler GICR 78), so Trachis at that time was
probably on the water.
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The site Rahkita cannot, however, be the site of Spartan
Herakleia.

Although there is easy access from Rakhita to the

corridor through Vardhates (Paus. 10.22.8; Szemler GICR 132 n.
56),

the

Trachinian

cliffs,

which

rise

dramatically

and

precipitously to the south of the site, 96 obstruct all views
to the south. With no

vista to the south, Rakhita would have

difficulty monitoring activity in the North Sector of the
corridor, and particularly, the Oitaians, whom the colony was
ostensibly founded to subdue.
Rakhita

to

Thermopylai

significantly
Thukydides

greater

gives

is

than

for

Furthermore, the distance from

the

ca.

the

40

46.4

stades

stades

distance

( 6. 9

from

km),

(8

km)

which

Herakleia

to

Thermopylai (3.92.6).
Bequignon 97 ,
Pritchett 100 ,

and

Leake 99 ,

Munro 98 ,
other

observers,

have

w.

Kendrick

correctly

placed

Herakleia between the Asopos and the Xirias rivers, but they
96

The railroad, constructed in 1890 and passing above
Rakhita, was required to blast tunnels blasted in the cliffs,
since there was no room for switchbacks.
97

Bequignon concluded the later citadel of Herakleia was
on the site of Mycenaean Trachis (Bequignon 1937:257).
98

According to Munro, Herakleia was founded on the site
of ancient Trachis, but when Herakleia moved up the hill in
later centuries, the lower town, six stades below, became
exclusively known as Trachis (JHS 22 (1902).
99

Leake concluded that Herakleia at the Roman siege in
the second century occupied the low ground between the
Mavroneria (Xirias) and Karvunaria (Asopos) at the same site
as the Trachis of Herodotos (II 1967:29).
100

Pritchett {1985:203) located Trachis on the same site
as later Herakleia.
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have erroneously assumed that Herakleia
the

site of Trachis

conclusion
(12.59.3)

may
that

city.

have
the

was established on

Contributing to

been

Diodoros

Lakedaimonians

this

erroneous

Sikoulos'

colonized

statement

Trachis

and

renamed it Herakleia; and Thukydides' statement (3.92.6) that
the

Spartans

built

new walls

uncertain whether Trachis
Herakleia was founded.

102

around Herakleia. 101

city was

still

inhabited

It

is

when

We may, nevertheless, assume that

the Spartans strengthened its fortifications, only 1 km away,
or

alternately,

subsumed

the

city

within

the

defensive

perimeters of the new colony.
Site of Herakleia
The site of Spartan Herakleia is to be sought on the
escarpment of the Trachinian cliffs above the left bank of the
Asopos river as it emerges from the gorge, at an elevation ca.
60 to 200 m (Wallace GICR 48; Szemler GICR 118).

The site is

ca. 7 km from the hot springs at Thermopylai. If Thukydides,
in measuring the distance from Thermopylai to Herakleia used

101

To Gomme (1956b: 395 n. 6) the evidence suggests
Herakleia was founded on a new site, contra Pritchett
1985:201. This issue will be discussed below, p. 59 ff .•
102

Al though Tr a chis existed when Herodotos visited the
area, Diodoros Sikoulos states Trachis was deserted when
Herakleia was founded (Diod. 12.59.4) The date of Herodotos'
visit to the area is uncertain. The final edition of his last
three books has been dated to the first years of the
Peloponnesian War (How & Wells 1928:1.9 par. 9 and n. 1), in
which event his visit to the area would have been before
Herakleia was founded.
48

the hot springs at Thermopylai as the base, as did Herodotos
(Hdt. 7.176.2), the distance of forty stades (6.9 km) which
Thukydides gives from Thermopylai to Herakleia fits precisely.
The placement by Thukydides of the colony twenty stades from
the sea also conforms to the assumed coast line in the fifth
century, ca. 3.5 km from the Trachinian cliffs, as suggested
by geological evidence. 103

This site is,

furthermore,

ca.

1.0 km SE of Rakhita. The measurement conforms to Strabo's
statement placing Herakleia

six stades

(ca.

1032 m)

from

Trachis (9.4.13).
The

Herakleia

extended ca.

described

by

Bequignon,

for

example,

0.50 km along the Trachinian cliffs from the

Skliphomeli gorge on the west to the Asopos gorge on the east
(Bequignon
described

1937:245-246).
are

no

longer

Many

monuments

extant. 104

which

Toward

the

Bequignon
northwest

along the present road to Ano Vardhates there are only a few
scattered sections and single blocks from the circuit wall
which Bequignon described. East of the old Lamia road near the
103

Kraft GICR 8/9 and Fig. 8-2. By the fifth century the
coast line was further east than in the Late Helladic period
and probably followed a line between the villages of
Moschohorion and Koroma (Szemler GICR 118), a distance of ca.
3.5 km.
104

The eastern wall system of the lower city was
completely destroyed by modern activity, especially bulldozing
(Wallace GICR 48). Bequignon had reported a 16 meter section
of wall, 3 meters high, near Aghia Paraskevi church east of
old Lamia road. This wall section no longer exists. The church
ruins in the immediate area are not Aghia Paraskevi but
reportedly the church of Zodohospigi, washed away by the
flooding of the Asopos. The rubble remains of Aghia Paraskevi
are about 30 or 40 meters to the south and east.
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gorge ·there

are

only

a

few

stone

remnants

of

the

site

identified by Bequignon as the gymnasium. 105
Sherds from the Classical period have been found in the
plain forty meters below the Trachinian cliffs along with
sherds from the Hellenistic and Roman periods,

as well as

remnants of the circuit wall of the city (Wallace GICR 48).
some investigators identified these remains as the site of the
spartan colony, although the archaeological evidence in the
plain

suggests

the

Herakleia

of

the

Aitolian

and

Roman

periods, described by Pausanias 106 and Livy. 101
The Classical sherds in the plain appear to be washout
from the Spartan colony founded at the higher elevation on the
escarpment of the Trachinian cliffs. The Hellenistic and Roman
sherds, and probably the remnants of the circuit wall, appear
to be of a

later period when the population of Herakleia

expanded into the Malian plain from the colony's original
perch.
1

~ Cut stones with dimensions as large as 0.65 m x 0.50

m are in situ. Parallel walls, ca. 10 m apart, each 2 blocks
high and ca. 3 m long, butt into the living rock of the

mountain. Bequignon's map, however, shows the gymnasium is
free standing and in a declivity in the mountain and not
abutting it.
The gymnasium played a tactical role in the
siege of Herakleia in 191 (Livy 36.22.7).
1

~ 10.20.4-in reference to Brennos' failure to take the
city in 279, although he plundered the surrounding fields and
slaughtered the people working there.
1

~
36.16.5-in reference to the battle at Herakleia in
191. Livy probably never visited the area and wrote nearly two
centuries after the campaign of Acilius Glabrio, cos. 191.
Thus, accepting his topography for fifth century Herakleia is
questionable.
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CHAPTER V
THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF HERAKLEIA
Herakleia's Connection with Dhema
and the Corridor Route system
The strategic importance of the colony lay in its
proximity to, and tactical connection with, the Dhema pass.
Based on autopsy, sight lines from the Trachinian cliffs are
unimpeded to the pinnacle of Aetos 1 ~ and to the citadel of
Kastro Orias 1 ~ on

the south and to the Malian Gulf on the

north and west. To the east, the view is unobstructed to the
Damasta spur of Mt. Kallidromos, approaching the west gate of
Thermopylai. These superb lookout points lend themselves to

1

~ The hill, Aetos, ca. 6 km SW of Herakleia, was within
the core area of the oitaians (Szemler GICR 83), whose
belligerence was instrumental in the foundation of the colony.
On the top, at a height of 950 m, there are remnants of a
fortification. on its eastern slopes sherds were excavated and
dated from the Early Neolithic to the Late Helladic periods.
Classical,
Hellenistic,
Roman
and
Byzantine
sherds,
contemporary with Herakleia, were also found.

From Aetos there are clear and unobstructed views of the
pass at Dhema; and of the Malian Gulf to the north (from
Frantzi on the west to the west gate of Thermopylai on the
east) . Toward the south, the site dominates the upper
Kephissos valley and the Gravia pass (Kase GICR 30; Wallace
GICR 50).
1

~ Kastro Orias,
ca. 4 km WSW of Herakleia at an
elevation of 743 m, was also in the territory of the Oitaians
(Szemler GICR 85). It offers excellent views of the Malian
Gulf and Gravia (Wallace GICR 50) •
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polybios'
(Polyb.

description

10.43-47)

immediately

of

of

fire

and

from which the

approaching

smoke

signalling posts

colony

could be alerted

danger

from

all

directions.

Herakleia would supply the permanent garrison for Dhema pass,
only 5 km away,

and control mass movements in and out of

central Greece.
Such a control was made possible by an elaborate road
system,
GICR

(designated by PDE as the "Herakleia roadway" Kase

25),

which

connected

Corridor's road system.

Herakleia

with

Dhema

and

the

This roadway is also the shortest

distance from the upland plains of Pergara and Zirelia between
Herakleia and Dhema to the Malian Gulf below. 110

The 5 km

long road is not a path, but a well-built and well-engineered
mountain roadway. It affords immediate and easy passage from
Herakleia to the Great Isthmus Corridor.

It could have been

constructed by the Spartans for direct access to Dhema and the
Corridor, when they founded Herakleia (Kase GICR 27).
The road ascends from the escarpments of the Trachinian
cliffs by means of wide-angle, banked turns and switchbacks.
In its course the roadbed alternates from packed colluvium to
rock. The rock cut section of the roadway is ca. 2.20-3.0 m
wide,

and it uses

retaining walls of placed stone on the

downside and terracing on the upside.

The first kilometer of

this roadway from Herakleia negotiates a steep section of the
110

Based on notes dictated to the writer by E.W. Kase at
autopsy of the region in 1987. For a detailed description of
the Herakleia road see Kase GICR 25-27.
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Trachinian cliffs.

It begins ca. 180 m southeast of a line of

ashlar blocks identified as the ancient city wall and at an
elevation of 60 m. As previously noted, it proceeds by wideangled banks, turns and switchbacks.

The road makes a steep

ascent to an elevation of 320 m where it turns around a large
semi-circular

platform

identified

as

the

phrourion

of

Herakleia. 111
At an elevation of 435 m the rock cut roadway becomes a
narrow causeway separating two ravines: to the north of the
causeway,

one

of

the

ravines,

the

Skliphomeli,

declines

northerly to form a cleft in the face of the Trachinian cliffs
and the westernmost limit of Herakleia;

to the south,

Siderhoporto ravine declines southward to
gorge.
highly

join the Asopos

The walled citadel of Herakleia was
defensible

identification

of

position
this

between

site

as

the

these
citadel

described by Livy in the Roman siege appears

the

situated in a
ravines.
of

The

Herakleia

certain. 112 The

111

A large rock-hewn semi-circular structure with a
diameter of 14.5 m N-S and 12.5 m E-W the perimeter of which
is outlined with small cut stones. The site furnishes a 180
degree view of the Malian plain. Wallace, probably referring
to the Malian plain rather than sea level, placed it at an
elevation of 280 m (Wallace GICR 48). This site was not
reported by Bequignon. The foundation of worked stone at a
lower elevation and ca. 150 m to the southeast, identified by
Bequignon as the phrourion, may have been the meeting place of
the Aitolian League (Kase GICR 26).
112

Livy's description of the siege of the citadel of
Herakleia unequivocally establishes this site as the citadel.
Acilius Glabrio deployed troops to a cliff about equal in
height to the citadel, but cut off from the citadel by a
valley so narrow that weapons could be hurled into it (Livy
36.24.8-9).
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roadway continued around the south side of the citadel.

A

short distance west of the citadel the two ravines converge
until they are separated only by a narrow causeway on which
the road continues.
Beyond the causeway the roadway divides

into a

north

branch and a south branch. The north branch ascends west by
northwest, before rounding at an elevation of 520 m the peak
of Mt. Panayia. It continues for ca. 2 km around the north end
of Delphinon before rejoining the south branch of the road.
The south branch ascends to an elevation of 575 m within a
distance of 650 m southwest of the citadel.

Here,

on an

eastward projecting flat-topped promontory overlooking the
lower end of the Asopos gorge, a site locally identified as
Siderhoporto is located.
After

the

north

113

and

south

branches

rejoin

west

of

Delphinon, the roadway continues an easy passage for about 2
km through the well-watered and fertile plains of Pergara and
Zirelia,

which

could

have

supplied

113

food

and

water

for

The ceramic evidence at Siderhoporto is contemporary
with Herakleia, and various conjectures concerning its
identity have been made. The site may have been the city of
Parasopioi, referred to by Strabo (9.2.23,9.5.10). Possibly,
the site may have been part of the defensive perimeter of
Herakleia (Kase CGICR 44 n. 18). Among modern investigators
Munro identified Siderhoporto as the citadel of Trachis,
concluding it must have been occupied in 480 by the Greeks to
bar passage through the gorge. Hignett believed Siderhoporto
was the citadel of Herakleia (1963:357). stahlin shared this
view (Plate XII 1, facing page 224). Grundy identified
Siderhoporto as the site of Herakleia in the post-Spartan
period, concluding it would command passage through the Asopos
gorge (1901:264).
54

personnel

of

the

Herakleia-Dhema-Thermopylai

complex.

The

Herakleia road then joined the Great Isthmus Corridor route
ca.

2. 5 km north of Kastro Orias

(Kase GICR 26).

Another

branch of the road joined the Isthmus Corridor route ca. 300
m south of Dhema.
Herakleia's connection with Thermopylai

In

light

of

the

intimate

geographic

and

strategic

connection of Herakleia and its well engineered roadway with
the Dhema pass and the Isthmus Corridor route, the connection
between

Herakleia

and

the

pass

at

Thermopylai

must

be

reassessed as well.
The

geological

investigation

of

PDE

has

revealed

startling evidence proving that until the end of the sixth
century the "gates" at Thermopylai were virtually closed by
the encroachment of the marine waters of the Malian Gulf upon
the alluvial fans of the rivers that drained Mts. Oiti and
Kallidromos (Kraft GICR 8). Thermopylai was not suitable for
the mass movement of men and goods before ca. 200 (Kraft GICR
6-8) and, therefore, unavailable through the greater part of
pre-Roman history as a major access route to southern Greece
(Kraft et al.

JFA 1987:194; Szemler GICR 110). Thus,

when

Herakleia was founded, Thermopylai was not yet passable for
major military and commercial traffic (Szemler GICT 112), and
would not have influenced the Spartans in their selection of
a site for their colony.
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Contrary

to

the

opinio, 114

communis

some

scholars

concluded that Herakleia was not intended to, nor did it ever,
control the pass at Thermopylai,

situated ca.

7 km to the

southeast (Cary CQ 1922:98/99; Bequignon 1937:254; Andrewes
1978:96 ff.; Hornblower 1991:505). But, without knowledge of
the Great Isthmus Corridor route and the pass at Dhema, they
assumed that the Asopos river bed, immediately to the east, in
a gorge ca.

60-200 m below the Trachinian cliffs was the

entrance to Central Greece, 115 and asserted that Herakleia
was to secure that entrance and not Thermopylai.
succinctly expresses
permit

a

this

opinion:

Bequignon

"Pourtant si Heracleia

Sparte de surveiller tout le golfe Maliaque, elle ne

commande pas les Thermopyles, mais elle se

borne

a barrer

l'acces en Beotie par l'Asopos" (1937:254).
The misleading assumption that Thermopylai provided the
primary access to Central Greece has been reinforced by the
interpretation given to a sentence of Thukydides:

,

,

'IJE(J)pla

TE

'Y
' etp<;aU
• I!
' eyt:pµo7rv"Aar:;
Q
,
7rapEUICEUU~OVTO
/Ca£.
TO' teara
t

ICaT

t\

aVTO

\

TO

I

<TTEVOV,

tr

07TCIJr:;

t

I

EVcpVAalCTa

auro£r:;

(3.92.6)

Ei1].

Most commentators who interpret this passage argue that
the Spartans, as a defensive measure, fenced off the approach
114

That the importance of Herakleia was its connection
with Thermopylai: Grundy 1901:268; Stahlin RE 8.68-425.9; Bury
1975:366; Pritchett 1985:191 ff .. Cf. Chapter III above.
115

Autopsy, however, has shown that passage through the
Asopos gorge for any movement, other than occasional mules, is
impossible and, in any event, seasonal (Szemler GICR 61-62).
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from Thermopylai by presumably placing a wall across the pass
itself. Although textual analysis is beyonc:I_the skill of this
writer, the acceptance of a reading of "

€..~? ~ n,'1

(a reading found only in MS E), rather than
(in

all

manuscripts), 116

other

:>,

"

t:'

"'"Y\p':>Cl.."1 \(:)

followed

by

"

Gerome's

characterization of the latter reading as "clearly impossible"
(1956b:397),

is questionable.

The author concedes that the

former reading fits syntactically; but the latter reading,
found

in

syntactical

other

all

manuscripts,

difficulties,

corresponds

notwithstanding

the

more

the

closely to

topographical features of the area. The latter, and possibly
more

appropriate,

reading,

i.e.

that

the

Spartans

made

preparations and began to put up boat slips along the shore
toward

Thermopylai

in

the

direction

of

the

pass

its elf,

eliminates any suggestion of a wall across the narrows toward
Thermopylai.
According

to

the

geological

evidence

of

PDE,

it

is

inconceivable that neoria, i.e. docks for triremes, or other
naval vessels with offensive capabilities, would have been
built

in the

western

Malian

fifth
Gulf

century

in the

adjacent

to

shallow waters

the

coastal

road

of

the

toward

Thermopylai. 117 These waters may have been deep enough for an
116

Thuk. ad l·.9.·, H. s. Jones and J. E. Powell, eds.; MS
E=llth century Heidelberg 252 (Palatinus), in Hall 1913:ad
Thuk.
117

Geological core borings suggests that in the fifth
century the waters adjacent to the west and middle gates at
Thermopylai had a depth of only 1-2 meters (Kraft GICR 8).
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Athenian

boat 11118

"rowing

to

remain

near

the

shore

and

maintain contact with the Greek army at Thermopylai during the
persian War, or for boat slips for flat bottomed, or slightly
v-shaped,

boats,

inadequate

for

not unlike modern sharpies,
anchoring

triremes

or

but probably

other

ships

with

offensive capabilities. 119
Thus,

according to the reading in the majority of the

manuscripts and the topographical evidence, it is improbable
that a wall was built by the Spartans across the pass at
Thermopylai;

and,

if a wall was built by the Spartans,

as

these commentators conclude, we are neither informed of its
purpose,

nor can we identify an enemy which this wall was

intended to block.
It is known there was a wall at Thermopylai,

but its

location is questionable. Spyridon Marinates found remains of
a wall at the Kolonos hill which he identified as the Phokian
wall described by Herodotos (Hdt. 7.176.3-5; Marinates 193940:333

ff.).

But,

it

was

shown

that

this

wall,

facing

southeast, was probably erected in the sixth century by the

118

Hdt. 8.21. tr. A. D. Godley.

119

The trireme had an estimated draft of 3 feet and with
its complement of 170 to 200 men, a displacement of ca. 69
tons (Rodgers 1964:45-48; Casson 1991:85}. Such a vessel would
appear to require deeper waters than the shore at Herakleia
Trachinia provided in the fifth century.
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Malians

as

a

defensive

wall

against

Phokian

raiders

( szemler, GICR 107) . 120
Ultimately, Gomme's suggestion must be rejected. There is
no evidence that the Spartans built a wall, either to secure
control of Thermopylai as an easy passage to and from Central
Greece,

or

to

remove

threats

from

the

north to

Sparta's

Lokrian, Phokian and Boiotian allies (Gomme 1956b:397). If the
Spartans built a wall at all,

it was probably intended to

def end against forays from the south-east along the coastal
road, possibly by the Athenians or their allies.
The

erection

of

a

wall

at

Thermopylai

had

little

strategic significance for the colony whose purpose -as was
argued above- was the control of activity in the Corridor's
road system.
When Herakleia was founded, Thermopylai was an available,
but less direct and desirable, route for entry into Central
Greece. Thermopylai had not yet become an essential component
of

the

Dhema-Herakleia

centuries,

became

the

defensive
main

line

complex which,
of

resistance

in

later

against

invaders. But even in the later centuries, Thermopylai was the
weak link of the defensive line and invariably became the main
target for

invasions,

when passage into the Corridor road

120

The wall was mistakenly identified by Herodotos as the
wall initially built by the Phokians against the Thessalians
and rebuilt by the Greeks in 480 against the Persians (Hdt.
8.27-33). For an analysis of this mistaken identification cf.
Szemler GICR 106 ff.
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system

through

Dhema

was

foreclosed

gerakleia.

60

by

the

defenders

of

CHAPTER VI
HERAKLEIA TO THE PEACE OF NIKIAS
Athenian Initiatives in central Greece
In the year of Herakleia's foundation, Athens conducted
two major campaigns in Central Greece. These campaigns were
responses

by

Athens

prompted

by

the

change

in

Sparta's

strategy to dominate Central Greece, to acquire control of the
Corridor, and to establish a base at Herakleia.
In the first major campaign Nikias, with 60 ships and
2,000 hoplites, joined forces at Tanagra with other Athenian
troops

under

Hipponikos

ancient sources recognize

and

Eurymedon. 121

Although

the

the troop movements of Nikias and

those of Hipponikos and Eurymedon as coordinated for concerted
action (3.91.5; Died 12.65.4), these sources fail to give a
purpose for these campaigns. One commentator has found this
failure "puzzling and unsatisfactory" (Kagan 1974:198).
In a second major campaign in 426 Demosthenes, commanding
a fleet of 30 Athenian ships, sailed around the Peloponnese

121

Athens' new offensive strategy is shown by Nikias's
426 campaign. After sailing to Melos and ravaging that island,
he landed at Oropos and then marched to Tanagra. After
Tanagra, he made a detour to pillage the Lokrian coast before
returning to Athens (3.91.1-5).
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and

attacked

Leukas,

Leukas.

however,

Right

before

Demosthenes

a

decisive

abandoned

proceeded against the Aitolians. 1n

this

victory

campaign

at
and

According to Thukydides,

Demosthenes made this decision "chiefly because he thought
that, without help from Athens (emphasis supplied), he would
be able with his allies from the mainland, once the Aitolians
had joined him, to make an overland expedition against the
Boiotians ••.

11

(3.95.1 tr. C.F. Smith).

Thukydides

is

not

Demosthenes' campaign,

clear about the proposed route

of

other than that he intended to pass

through Ozolian Lokris to Kytinion (3. 95 .1). 123

Demosthenes

most probably planned to use the South Sector of the Corridor
to get to Kytinion. 124

Kytinion,

as part of the tetrapolis

122

Thukydides informs us that Demosthenes was induced to
undertake this new campaign not only because the Aitolians
were hostile to Naupaktos, a strategic naval base of Athens,
but also by the prospect that by defeating the Aitolians "he
would find it easy to bring the mainland in that region into
subjection to the Athenians (3.94.3 tr. C.F. Smith).
123

Gomme suggested that the campaign followed the Mornos
river valley (probably the modern Daphnous) and Demosthenes
intended to cross the headwaters of the Mornos at the
watershed of Mt. oite (Gemme 1956b:482). B.W. Henderson also
accepts this view, indicating it is only a march of eight
miles across the watershed to the north-south road in Doris
(1927:55). This suggestion must be rejected. Although the trek
across the watershed does reach, and is a short distance from,
the north-south road in Doris (the Isthmus Corridor route)
south of the Pindos river near modern Kastelli (Kase GICR 31),
autopsy of PDE has determined it is impassable for any
fighting force.
124

Al though Amphissa, the dominant city in the South
Sector, had been allied with Sparta since the beginning of the
war (Died. 12.42.4), the rest of the West Lokrians were allies
of Athens (Gomme 1956b:403-405). Demosthenes had used oineon
in West Lokris both in his invasion of Aitolia (3.95.3) and in
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of Doris, was most certainly one of the areas "liberated" by
Sparta from Oitaian incursions, and we can assume that in 426
it was under Spartan control. Its strategic importance to the
corridor has been previously discussed. It is no surprise that
Demosthenes intended to make Kytinion an objective of his
campaign.

In

the

hands

of

Athens

Kytinion

would

disrupt

Sparta's access to the Central Sector of the Corridor.
Demosthenes intended to proceed from Kytinion through
Phokis,
right,

with Kallidromos on his left and Parnassos on his
and

purpose

of

Phokians

invade

Thukydides

offensive. 125

this

would

Boiotia.

be

eager

to

He
join

does

not

only tells

give

us

the Athenian

the

that the
expedition

(3.95.1).
Both Nikias and Eurymedon's campaigns in eastern Boiotia
and

Demosthenes'

campaign

in

Aitolia

are

described

Thukydides as occurring in the sixth year of the war,

by
i.e.

426/425. He dates the campaign of Nikias as occurring in "that
same

summer"

( 3. 91. 1

tr

c. F. Smith) ;

and

the

campaign

of

Demosthenes "during the same summer" (3.94.1-3), but he fails
to

make

any

foundation

of

connection
Herakleia

between

the

"about

this

two.
time"

He

dates

the

(3.92.1

tr.

his retreat (3.98.3).
125

Gornme' s opinion that the purpose of the campaign was
to overthrow Boiotia (Gornme 1956b:402) does not appear
probable. The periodic invasion of Attica by Boiotian cavalry
(4.95.2;4.96.8) would not appear to justify such a campaign.
Kagan recognizes the value of Demosthenes' campaign in
disrupting Spartan passage to Herakleia (Kagan 1974:208).
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c.F.Smith), but he makes no connection between the foundation
of the colony and the two Athenian campaigns. Thukydides even
suggests

that

undertaking

Demosthenes'

without

the

campaign

knowledge

or

was

a

spontaneous

approval

of

Athens

p.95.1).
The

conclusion

seems

strong,

however,

that

the

two

Athenian campaigns not only were related, but also were direct
counter- measures

to

the

change

in

Sparta's

strategy

for

conducting the war. The Euryrnedon-Nikias campaigns, occurring
in eastern Boiotia, were synchronized to detract the Boiotians
from Athens' real objective, western Boiotia and Phokis (Kagan
1974:208). The western campaign would have expanded Athenian
influence in Phokis and threatened

the newly planned colony

at Herakleia.
Spartan Reaction
According

to

Thukydides,

the

Lakedaimonians,

toward

autumn 1u 426, dispatched 3,000 hoplites to Central Greece in
preparation for the capture of Naupaktos

( 3. 100. 2) . 127

The

126

Gemme suggests Eurylochos' campaign was about the end
of September or early October (Gemme 1956b:409).
127

Naupaktos was Lokrian at the beginning of the fifth
century (Meiggs & Lewis 1975: No 20; Szemler CGICR 91).
Athenian influence began in 462 with the settlement under
Athenian
safe conduct,
of Messenian helots,
who had
surrendered at Mt. Ithome (1.102-103). At the beginning of the
war Naupaktos was allied with Athens (2.9.4; Died. 12.42.4).
In two stunning battles near Naupaktos in 429 Phormio
defeated the Peloponnesian fleet (2.83-92). Phormio's naval
victories insured this naval fortress its stranglehold in the
Corinthian Gulf (Adcock, CAH 5:211; Kagan 1974:115; Hammond
1986:355; Bengtson 1988:139).
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army

convened

at

Delphi

under

the

Spartan

general,

Eurylochos. The evidence suggests that the campaign, triggered
by Demosthenes' campaign in Aitolia, was probably intended to
safeguard for Sparta the route to Herakleia through the South
sector of the Corridor.
Sparta's control of the South Sector of the Corridor was
indeed vulnerable from Naupaktos. Naupaktos, a major Athenian
naval

station,

Corinthian
exports,
along

commanded

Gulf,

could

all

traffic

curtail

grain

in

and

out

imports

of

and

the

trade

and could cause economic ruin for Sparta's allies

the

coast

of

the

Corinthian Gulf

(Kagan

1976: 30;

Bengtson 1988:139). Nevertheless, the stranglehold which this
naval fortress had on the western Corinthian Gulf does not
appear to have posed a threat to Sparta's interests to explain
Eurylochos' campaign. For Athens to close off the grain supply
to the Peloponnese by blockading the Gulf was impossible. 1u
The chief threat which Naupaktos posed for Sparta was
that Naupaktos might become a base for Athens to launch an
attack upon the South Sector of the Corridor. Such an attack
could

have

come

through

the

Elates

pass

that

provides

a

practical passage across the formidable Ghiona mountain range,
separating Naupaktos from Amphissa, in West Lokris (3.101.2),
The West Lokrians, with the exception of Amphissa which was
topographically separate,

were friendly to Athens

( 3. 95. 3;

3.101.1; Gemme 1956b:ll; Hornblower 1991:248). Athens might,
iu Kagan 1974:29; contra Miltner, RE 19:781.
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at any time,

with

the

support of

Naupaktos

and the West

Lokrians, launch an offensive through the Elates pass against
.Alllphissa. Eurylochos' campaign to capture Naupaktos appears to
have been intended to remove permanently this threat.
We

are

not

informed

when

Eurylochos to Central Greece, 129

Sparta

decided

to

send

but the decision may have

been made before Demosthenes aborted his campaign in Aitolia.
Demosthenes' campaign, if successful, would have undermined
Sparta's control of the Corridor and the Thracian offensive.
Thus, Eurylochos' preparations appear to have been directed
against Demosthenes. 130
The troops which Eurylochos mustered at Delphi included
500 hoplites from Herakleia,
withdrawn

through

the

and these obviously had to be

Corridor

from

Herakleia

to

Delphi

(3.100.2). Thus, we must assume that in August 426, a month or
two

before

Eurylochos'

campaign,

the

Spartans

already

controlled the entire Isthmus Corridor route. In the North and
Central Sectors of the Corridor Sparta had consolidated its
influence by eliminating the Oitaian forays against Doris and

1

~ In Thukydides (3.100.1) the Aitolians had urged Sparta
to capture the stronghold, even before Demosthenes began his
campaign. The Messenians at Naupaktos had previously invited
Athens to intervene against Aitolia,
which presumably
explained Aitolian's hostility to Naupaktos (3.100.1). Gemme
suggests that the invitation from Aitolia to Sparta to take
action against Naupaktos was extended before the actual
invasion of Aitolia by Demosthenes (Gemme 1956b:408).
130

Demosthenes never reached the Corridor. On his way
from Naupaktos he was defeated by the Aitolians and was forced
to abandon his campaign (3.98.3-5; Szemler GICR 117).
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Trachis, while in the South Sector, Amphissa controlled the
multiple road system and was cooperative with Sparta. 131

The

convergence of Eurylochos' army at Delphi suggests that even
the sacred precinct, on the perimeter of the South Sector, was
in the pro-Spartan camp. 132

campaigns in 424
Although

the

Herakleia in 426,

Spartans

had

established

a

base

at

they were unable to use this base as a

launching pad for an assault on Athens' allies in Thrace until
the summer of 424 (4.78.1), because such a campaign required
the cooperation of the king of Macedon and local oligarchs in
Thessaly,
cross

through whose territories Spartan troops had to

(Brunt JCAC 1965:274). The opportunity for Sparta came

in 424 when Perdikkas, the king of Macedon, needed military
assistance to subdue the revolt of his vassal, Arrhabaios,
king of the Lynkestr ian Macedonians

( 4. 8 3 • 1) • 133

Perdikkas

131

Thukydides informs us that Amphissa cooperated with
Eurylochos chiefly because of fear of the Phokians (3.101.2).
1

~ As additional evidence of Delphi's pro-Spartan posture
at this time: Delphi bid Sparta to found its colony at
Herakleia (3.92.5); at the beginning of the war Delphi had
predicted victory for the Lakedaimonians and promised
assistance to them (1.118.3).
133

Perdikkas, the king of Macedon, dedicated to the
politics of expediency, had throughout his reign vacillated in
his relations not only with Athens, but with all his
neighbors.
Prior to the founding of Amphipolis in 436 by Athens,
Perdikkas had been her ally, but the new garrisons there
alarmed him, no less than they alarmed the Potidaians, and he
shifted his
allegiance
(Hammond
1986: 317) .
Amphipolis
furthermore had obstructed his aspirations of regaining the
67

for this purpose sought the help of Sparta, promising to share
the cost of Spartan troops (4.80.1; 4.83.5-6).
Perdikkas'

invitation

came

at

a

critical

moment

for

Sparta. Athens had recently assumed an aggressive posture,
attributable

perhaps

to

a

new

war

faction

at

the

helm

(Bengtson 1988:141). In 424 Sparta was fighting a defensive
war, punctuated by Athenian raids throughout the coast of the
Peloponnese,
almost

the occupation of Kythera

total

blockade

of

the

by Nikias

Peloponnese

1974: 263-264; Bengtson 1988: 141) . 134

and the

( 4. 53-57;

Kagan

The surrender in August

424 of Sparta's hoplites at Sphakteria highlighted the crisis
and led to Sparta's vain overtures for peace (4.11-15; Kagan
1974:237-238).

It appeared to be only a matter of time before

Sparta would be

forced

to her knees

Sparta hastily accepted the

(Bengtson

1988: 141).

invitation of Perdikkas which

could make her newly formulated strategy of attacking Athens
in Thrace a reality (Brunt JCAC 1965:274; Kagan 1974:289).

coast line and the mining revenues of Mt. Pangaion (Hdt.
5.17). Athenian support of his brother, Philip, as a rival to
the throne exacerbated his hostility (1.57.2). Covertly and
unsuccessfully, he had sought to get Sparta to deploy military
forces against Athens (Hammond 1986:320). Partly due to his
instigation both the Chalkidians and the Bottiaians revolted
from Athens in 432 (4.56.1-2; 4.57.3). Although a nominal ally
of Athens in 429, he offered no assistance to the Athenians in
their offensive in the Chalkidike (2.79.1-5).
1

~. Athens now held fortified posts at Pylos, Kythera,
Methana, Nisaia, Minoa, Pteleon and Atalante, and her fleet
had bases at Zakynthos, Kephallenia, Korkyra, Naupaktos and
Akarnania (Hammond 1986:369).
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Brasidas,

the

daring

and

highly

imaginative

general, took command of the campaign ( 4. 78 .1.) 135

Spartan
He began

recruiting forces in the Peloponnese for a counter-offensive
for Spartan losses in the Peloponnese.
In August of the same year, Athens initiated a campaign
to gain control of the Megarid. The scope of this offensive
cannot be

invasions of Attica. 136

future
427,

justified as an attempt by Athens to block off

became

( 4. 67. 1) . 137
general,

the

base

for

Minoa,

this

taken by Athens

new

Athenian

in

offensive

In a coordinated campaign between the Athenian

Hippokrates,

with

a

garrison

from

Minoa,

and

Demosthenes who had just returned to Athens from his campaign
in Aitolia and Naupaktos (4.66.3-4), the Athenians breached
and occupied the Long Walls joining Megara to Nisaia, Megara's

135

Commentators have drawn di verse conclusions concerning
Brasidas' role in the campaign. According to Thukydides
(4.81.1), the Spartans sent him on this mission, chiefly from
his own des ire ( 2:> o \.:>A.~ ~ e:v b~
) , supported by Gemme
(1956b:548); and Kagan- (1974:289). Contra, c. Hude (ed.
Teubner) who reads ~o\J_>..6 ~t..\IO\., supported by Adcock (CAH
5 243); and Hammond (198b:372), according to whom the Spartans
supported Brasidas' campaign. Hude's conjecture is followed by
the author.
136

Sparta had several years earlier abandoned hope that
the invasions of Attica would bring Athens to her knees (Gemme
1956b:395). Sparta's most recent invasion on Attica in 425,
the year before the Megarid offensive, lasted only 15 days,
the shortest campaign conducted (4.2.1;4.6.2).
137

Athens had captured Minoa about the same time as
Plataiai's final surrender to the Spartans (3.52.1). We may
speculate whether the fall of this last barrier to Sparta's
expanding presence in Central Greece may have invoked an
Athenian resolve to stop the enemy at the Megarid.
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port

on

the

Saronic

Gulf

( 4. 68)

138

,

and

captured

Nisaia

(4.66-77). Sparta was faced with the alarming possibility that
Megara itself would go over to the Athenians. 139
The Athenian offensive against Nisaia was

undertaken

while Brasidas was in Sikyon and Corinth, recruiting troops
for the march to Thrace (4.70.1). Brasidas, fearful lest the
Athenian armies under Demosthenes and Hippokrates should take
Megara, marched to its defense (4.70.1). He also summoned the
Boiotians to join him,
cavalry. 140

Although

and they responded with troops and
Nisaia

had

fallen

before

Brasidas

arrived, his presence brought about a stalemate between the
Athenian and the Spartan forces which ultimately resulted in

138

By this action the Athenian generals prevented the
Spartans, entrenched in Nisaia, from giving support to Megara
(4.66.4).
139

As early as 427 Megara was undergoing civil strife
(4.67.1), aggravated by the dreadful economic boycott imposed
by Athens (Jones 1968:72). The oligarchic faction, previously
expelled from Megara by the democrats, was entrenched at
Pegai. The democrats in Megara, fearing their return, enlisted
the aid of Athens and promised to deliver the city to her
(4.66.3-4), permitting the opening of her ports for trade, and
possibly, ending the civil war. Spartan troops, apparently
unaware of these covert intrigues, were garrisoned at Nisaia
to counter the Athenian presence at Minoa.
140

The Boiotians recognized that Megara in the hands of
Athens would isolate them from the Peloponnese and leave
Athens free to attack them (4.72.1; Gemme 1956b:532). So
concerned were they with this danger that they began their
troop movements to assist Megara even before the summons from
Brasidas arrived. The Athenians were startled, since they had
never seen any previous Boiotian support for Megara in their
earlier incursions in the Megarid (4.72.1).
70

the acceptance by Megara of Brasidas' army and the end of the
Athenian initiative. 141
Brasidas

returned

to

Corinth

and

continued

his

preparations for Thrace (4.74.1). Thukydides does not suggest
any connection between the Athenian offensive against Nisaia
and

Brasidas'

imminent

march

to

Thrace. 142

Modern

commentators have either ignored this question (Adcock CAH 5;
Hammond 1986:372)

or denied any Athenian awareness

(Kagan

1974: 278, following Gemme 1956b: 535-36). 143
The implication that the Athenians did not know what was
going on is unacceptable and must be rejected. Brasidas had
been recruiting throughout the Peloponnese to hire an army.
The army that marched to Thrace had 700 freed helots,

or

neodamodeis, but no Spartans; the bulk of the army was from

141

When neither side attacked, the Athenians withdrew
and retired into Nisaia, and the Megarians thereupon opened
their gates to Brasidas (4.73.4). The Athenian strategy for
the betrayal of the city by the democratic element evaporated.
Athens lost a great strategic opportunity by the failure of
the Megarian campaign
(Kagan 1974:278).
Athens'
early
withdrawal from Megara has been criticized (Gemme 1956b:5353 6) •
142

Thukydides tells us that when the Athenians heard
about Brasidas' arrival in Thrace, they realized that
Perdikkas' intrigues had made the march possible, and they
declared war on him
( 4. 82 .1) . The inference is that the
Athenians did not know about Brasidas' planned campaign before
Brasidas arrived in Thrace.
143

Although Gemme accepts that the Athenians were
unaware of Sparta's intended campaign, he suggests Thukydides
recognized a connection in the simultaneity between the
campaigns in Delion and Thrace (Gemme 1956b:540).
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the Peloponnese (4.80.5) . 144

When the Athenian offensive in

the Megarid began, Brasidas was already in Corinth, ca. 38 km
away.

This proximity at such a

critical moment cannot be

ascribed to chance. For the same reasons Thukydides' statement
that Brasidas

just happened to be

in the neighborhood of

Corinth when the Athenian assault began

( 4. 70 .1),

and the

opinions of commentators who accept this view (Grote 6.380;
Adcock CAH 5:239; Hammond 1986:368), must also be rejected. It
is more credible that the Athenians were aware of Sparta's
imminent march to Thrace,

and the Spartans were aware of

Athens' new aims against the Megarid.
The threat which these preparations portended may have
triggered the Athenian resolve for action in the Megarid. The
Athenians would be uncertain which route the Spartans would
use to get to their base at Herakleia. If the Spartans elected
to take the overland route through Boiotia and Phokis, the
Athenian control of the Megarid would block the Spartans at
Megara and stop Brasidas' march.
If,

on the other hand,

the Spartans elected to ferry

troops to Kirrha and march through the Isthmus Corridor to
Herakleia, Athenian control of the Megarid would still serve
a highly strategic purpose. Without the threat of a Spartan

1

« Thukydides informs us that the Lakedaimonians were
glad for an excuse to send out 700 helots to forestall their
siding with the Athenians at this sensitive time, when Pylos
was in the hands of the enemy (4.80.2,5). Hammond suggests the
entire Lakedaimonian campaign was a diversion for this purpose
(1986:372).
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army at her back Athens would be free to regain her influence
in Phokis (Gemme 1956b:532). which, as previously noted, was
the linchpin for the control of the Central Sector of the
Isthmus Corridor. The destabilization of the Central Sector by
Athens would undermine the viability of

Sparta's base at

Herakleia and Sparta's imminent campaign to Thrace.
Thukydides does not specify the route Brasidas took from
the Peloponnese to Herakleia. He probably ferried his army
across the Corinthian Gulf to Kirrha, the south terminus of
the Great
troops

Isthmus

through

the

Corridor route 145 ,
Corridor

to

and then marched his

Herakleia.

He

arrived

at

Herakleia that summer with 1,700 hoplites (4.78.1). He then
marched without resistance through Thessaly (4.78.2-6; 79.1).
Al though the Thessalians were allies of Athens, 146 and the
common people well-disposed to the Athenians

(4.78.2),

the

local oligarchs were themselves pro-Spartan. The assistance
which these oligarchs gave Brasidas and his adroitness in

145

Thukydides only informs us that before his march
Brasidas returned to Corinth from Megara to continue
preparations for Thrace ( 4. 74 .1). The same considerations that
suggest a sea crossing for Sparta's troops before the
Archidamian War and in 426 (cf. Chapter IV above) would apply
to Brasidas in 424. Contra, Bengtson who suggests a route
through Megara and Boiotia in 424 (Bengtson 1988:141-42).
1

~ The Thessalians had become allies of Athens following
the Messenian revolt at Ithome, ca. 457 (l.102.4). At the
beginning of the war the Thessalian cavalry assisted the
Athenians against the Spartan invasion of Attica
(2.22.3).
The Thessalians continually made war upon Herakleia after its
foundation (3.93.2), an action implying hostility to Sparta.
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dealing with them insured his rapid and uneventful passage
(4.78.2-5;
controlled

Gomme
the

1956b: 541). 147

splendid

If

Thessalian

the

oligarchs

cavalry

had

who

opposed

Brasidas' army in the flat and level plains of Thessaly, it is
doubtful whether the army would have been able to cross (Kagan
1974:288).
Brasidas' campaign in Thrace proved eminently rewarding
for Sparta. City after city revolted from the Athenians and
admitted

the

Peloponnesians. 148 The

fall

of

Amphipolis

in

particular encouraged rebellion in the rest of Thrace (Kagan
1974:302)
(Hammond

and

dealt

1986:373;

a

severe

Bengtson

blow

to

1988:142).

Athenian
Cities

prestige

that

were

subject to Athens, hearing of the capture of Amphipolis and
the

moderate

terms

offered

by

Brasidas,

were

incited

to

revolution and sent emissaries to Brasidas, urging him to come
over to them (4.108.3).
147

In contrast, in 423, the Thessalian oligarchs' changed
attitude prevented the Spartan, Ischagoras, in his plans to
join Brasidas with a Spartan force ((4.132). Such a change of
attitude might have been the result of a possible alliance
between Perdikkas and the Athenians in 423, an alliance based
on an extremely fragmentary inscription dated to 423 by Gemme
1956b:621/2, 720, followed by Bengtson 1962: #186, and Kagan
1974:314. In 421 a Lakedaimonian army of 900 intended to
furnish support to Brasidas but was delayed by Thessalian
opposition and was recalled after Brasidas' death (5.13; Kagan
1974:331).
148

Revolt at Akanthos in August, 424 (4. 88 .1) was
followed by revolt at Stagira (4.88.2). The fall of Amphipolis
in December, 424 (4.106.1) precipitated an immediate and
domino-like defection by Athen's northern allies, beginning
with Mirkinos, Galepsos and Oisyme, east of the Strymon river
(4.107.3). The numerous cities of the Akte peninsula were next
to revolt or capitulate (4.109; Kagan 1974:302).
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As mentioned above, Sparta's strategy for a campaign in
Thrace had depended on three specific conditions: domination
of Central Greece,

control of the Corridor,

and securing a

base at Herakleia. The validity of Sparta's purpose in the
foundation of Herakleia as part of a land route to Thrace was
proven by the success of the Thracian campaign in bringing
about a truce. Conversely,

since there is no evidence that

Herakleia was ever used by the Spartans as a

naval base,

Thukydides' suggestion that Herakleia was intended for that
purpose (3.92.4) must be rejected.
Athenian Response

In

the

same

sum.mer,

immediately after

the Athenians

retired from Megara, but after Brasidas had reached Thrace,
Athens undertook two coordinated campaigns in Boiotia (4.76.13). That these campaigns in Boiotia were part of the same plan
with the campaign in the Megarid has generally been recognized
(Gorn.me 1956b:719-720; Adcock CAH 5:239; Kagan 1974:278). The
connection,

however,

between these

Boiotian campaigns and

Brasidas' march to Thrace, as with the Megarian campaign, has
been overlooked.
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In

the

first

Boiotian

campaign

Siphai, 149

by

the

prearrangement of certain conspirators within the city, was to
be

betrayed

to

Demosthenes.

Chaironeia, 150

through

the

intrigues of disgruntled refugees from Orchomenos, was also to
yield to him

( 4. 76. 3) . 151

Demosthenes recruited troops at

Naupaktos and sailed with 40 ships to Siphai (4.76.1) where he
was

scheduled

to

arrive

at

a

predetermined

date I

152

1
"

Siphai is situated on the shores of the Corinthian
Gulf in the territory of Thespiai and is a port of entry into
Boiotia (4.76.3). It is situated 7 km to the southeast of
Thisbe (Frazer Paus. 9.32.4) and 8 kms. southwest of Thespiai.
Its importance as a harbor town is established not only by
tradition, but also by archaeological evidence. The site was
also known as Tipha, taking its name from the pilot of the
Argo who came from Siphai (Keiji Kodai 1991:55). It would have
been easier for Athens to attack Boiotia through Plataiai, but
this city had surrendered to Sparta three years earlier
(3.52.1; Gonune 1956b:541).
15

°

Chaironeia' s location is 7 km south of Parapotamioi,
situated at the pass (ca. 5 km wide) between Phokis and the
first plain of Boiotia, the Kaironeian Basin, and through
which the Kephissos river enters Boiotia from Phokis (Strabo
9.3.16; Fossey 1986:70-71).
151

As in Megara, a month or so earlier, the occasion for
Athenian intervention was the disaffection of local citizens
who wished to transform their city into a democracy (4.76.2).
152

Demosthenes retired from the Megara campaign ca.
August, but his offensive against Siphai was not planned to
take place until the beginning of November, some three months
later (4.89.l; Gonune 1956b:558). Since the success of the
Boiotian campaign required surprise, the delay may have been
intended to sail undetected to Siphai. Although Sparta had in
425 turned over her fleet to Athens as collateral in the peace
negotiations following Sphakteria ((4.16.1-3; 4.23.1), Sparta
had access to at least seven other navies (Kelly 31).
Lakedaimonian ships, particularly Corinthian and Sikyonian,
invested, or probably controlled, the eastern Corinthian Gulf
in 424. A November sailing might be undetected, since rarely
would ships sail in winter months (Casson 1973:270 n. 3). From
the third day before the ides of November to the sixth day
before the ides of March, the seas were closed (Vegetius
76

coordinated with

the

second Athenian

campaign

in

eastern

Demosthenes' plan was to make a short march from

Boiotia.

siphai through Lebadeia to Chaironeia, bypassing any hostile
forces from Thebes.

Phokians collaborated with Demosthenes in

this plot (4.76.3).

Thus, we may assume the plan included

Athenian penetration into western Phokis, as well as delivery
in Athenian hands of Phokian Phanoteus and Parapotamioi. 153
While these events were occurring in western Boiotia,
Athenian hoplites under Hippokrates would march from Athens to
Tanagra in Boiotia and occupy the sanctuary of Apollo at
Delion (4.76.4)

The Athenian plot, however, was ill-timed and

betrayed to the Boiotians. The Athenians never set foot at
Siphai, and at Delion they suffered a major military defeat
(4.89.1; 4.96; Bengtson 1986:142).
The enormity of the military defeat suffered by Athens in
the

only

pitched

1986: 371)

has

battle

magnified

in

the

the

Archidamian

strategic

War

importance

(Hammond
of

the

campaign. Thukydides mistakenly treats the eastern campaign of
Hippokrates at Delion as the primary action and the SiphaiChaironeia campaign as only a diversion to insure the success

1885:4.39).
1

~ Panopeus, also known as Phanoteus, situated at the
Kephissos river about 20 stadia (ca. 3.6 km) west of
Chaironeia (Paus. 10.4.1), was a point of convergence between
the road leading from Boiotia up the Kephissos river valley to
Phokis and the road to Delphi around the southern slopes of
Mt. Parnassos (Strabo 9.3.14 9.2.19; Paus. 10.4.1-2).
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of the Delion assault. 154

In neither the campaigns of 426

nor in the campaigns of 424 was the Athenian purpose the
conquest

of

oemosthenes

Boiotia

(Gomme

and Hippokrates

1956b:539).

in the

424

In

reality,

campaign repeated

precisely the same strategy they had used unsuccessfully in
the 426 campaign.
In both years the Athenians intended by the campaigns in
the west to destabilize Sparta's control of the Corridor and
regain

a

dominant

presence

in Phokis.

In

both years

the

campaigns in the east were diversionary maneuvers. In 426 the
Athenians hoped to destabilize the Corridor by an attack on
Kytinion via Aitolia and West Lokris. In 424, the Athenians
hoped to accomplish the same goal through Chaironeia and the
Kephissos valley.
If the Athenian offensive in 424 had been successful, it
is probable that Phokis and the Central Sector of the Isthmus
Corridor

route would

have

come

under Athenian

influence.

Although Brasidas' army had already reached Thrace, perhaps
three months earlier, Athens' control of the Corridor would

154

According to Thukydides the purpose of this twopronged attack was that in this way the Boiotians "might not
concentrate their forces at Delium" (4.76.4 (C.F.Smith tr).
Gemme finds the use of the temple site by the Athenians as a
base for continuing raids on, or encouraging revolution in,
neighboring
Boiotian
villages
an
acceptable
purpose,
consistent with the similar use of bases at Kythera and Pylos
(Gornme 1956b:538).
78

have

thwarted

Brasidas'

spectacular

reversal

of

earlier

Spartan misfortunes. 155
Results

As
revenues,

a

result
and

the

of

the

gold

Thracian

mines

of

campaign

Mt.

Athens

Pangaion

fell

lost
into

Sparta's hands. With the timber from the area Brasidas could
start

building a

fleet

(4.108.1;

Hammond:

1986:373).

The

bridgehead at the Strymon river was opened to the Spartans,
and

Brasidas

urgently

begged

the

Lakedaimonians

for

reinforcements, a plea which the Spartans chose not to heed
(4.108.7;

Kagan

1974:303).

It

appears

probable

that

he

intended a major campaign, aiming at a decisive victory (Kagan
1976:302). He may have intended an eastward thrust to gain
control of the Hellespont and interdict the Athenian grain
supplies from the Black Sea (Kagan 1974:302-303).
The possibility of such an assault, and of further revolt
among their allies, greatly alarmed the Athenians (4.108.1;
4.108.7). This alarm most likely contributed to the Athenian
receptiveness to Sparta's overtures for peace

(Adcock CAH

5:244; Kagan 1974:303-304). For Sparta the campaign in Thrace
was a tactical lever to get the Athenians to the negotiating

155

Brasidas march to Thrace from Herakleia was probably
mid-August
(4.78.1;
Gemme 1956b:720;
Kagan
1974:287).
Demosthenes reached Siphai early in November (4.77.1; Kagan
1974:281).
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table. 156

Sparta was not interested in total victory,

but

rather, wished to recover the prisoners from Sphakteria and
bring the war to an end (4.108.7).
Sparta's campaign in Thrace was made possible because
Sparta controlled a communication route through Central Greece
and a fortified eagle's nest on the Trachinian cliffs.
spring 423
armistice

the success

In

of this campaign precipitated the

which Sparta wanted (4.117.1) and, eventually, a

peace treaty. 157

156 •

Ever since the capture of the Spartans on Sphakteria
the peace faction in Sparta had been dominant and had sent
missions to the Athenians to explore peace, but were rejected
(Kagan 1974:303).
157

That the truce was broken, and fighting resumed,
before a peace was finally concluded may be attributed to the
personalities of Kleon and Brasidas, to whom Thukydides
referred as the men on each side most opposed to peace
(5.16.1; Gomme 1956b:660; Kagan 1974:331), and not to any
defect in the Spartan plan. Included in the terms of the Peace
of Nikias was the return of the prisoners from Sphakteria
(5.18.7). It is worthy of note that the first stipulation of
the treaty grants free access to Delphi for all worshippers
(5.18.1), suggesting Sparta still controlled the Corridor.
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CONCLUSION
Sparta selected Herakleia as the site for a colony in
Trachis land to control the Isthmus Corridor road system and
establish a base for the invasion of Thrace.
Unaware of this road system, most commentators believe
that Herakleia's role was closely connected with Thermopylai.
But the city neither neutralized nor controlled the pass. In
the

fifth

century

this

pass

was

virtually closed

by the

encroachment of the Malian Gulf, and was not suitable for the
mass movements of men or goods. It was an available, but less
desirable, route for entry into Central Greece.
The strategic importance of Herakleia was its connection
with the Great Isthmus Corridor road system, and specifically,
its proximity to,

and tactical connection with,

the north

entrance to that road system, the Dhema pass.
Sparta's resolve to maintain control of the Corridor road
system,

counterbalanced by Athens' efforts to thwart

that

control, defined military actions in the Archidamian War, the
purpose

of which previously has

been unclear.

Among such

military actions were: Sparta's two year siege, beginning in
429, to capture Plataiai; Athens' invasion of the Megarid in
the same year, ostensibly
the

largest

military

to conduct a raid, but utilizing
force

Athens

ever

assembled;

Demosthenes' campaign in 426, reportedly extemporaneous, but
aimed at Kytinion,

which happened to be a

Central

the Corridor road

Sector of

81

linchpin of the

system;

Athens'

two-

pronged campaign in 424, again led by Demosthenes, aimed at
western Boiotia and Phokis,

the underbelly of the Central

Sector of the Corridor road system;

Eurylochos'

siege to

capture Naupaktos, which did not infringe Sparta's interests
by its domination of the western Corinthian Gulf,

but did

threaten the South Sector of the Corridor road system.
In 424 Brasidas executed the new strategy by launching
the much planned invasion of Thrace.

As shown above,

invasion

revolt

induced

domination,

Athens'

allies

to

from

this

Athenian

brought about a truce and an end to the war,

vindicating the purpose for which Herakleia was founded.
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